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Abstract

SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND RETICENCE: MENTAL NEGOTIATIONS IN AUSTEN,
BRONTË, AND ELIOT

By Meredith Leigh Spencer, M.A.
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at
Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2015.
Director: Dr. Katherine Saunders Nash
Associate Professor, Director of Undergraduate Studies, Department of English

This thesis examines how three nineteenth-century British novels purvey and critique
contemporary standards regarding social performance and reticence and the strains such
standards place on those whose dispositions disincline them to conform to the regulations for
decorum articulated in conduct books of the time. Utilizing the psychological lens of introversion
and extroversion alongside the cognitive narrative theories of Alan Palmer and Lisa Zunshine,
this thesis investigates the construction of individual character identities through the reading of
interactions among multiple fictional minds in Charlotte Brontë’s Villette (1853), Jane Austen’s
Pride and Prejudice (1813), and George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss (1860).

	
  

	
  

	
  

Introduction

Men and women during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries faced blatantly
contradictory expectations with regard to public presentation and engagement, often having to
negotiate under which situations to project sociability or exercise restraint. Conduct books
published during this era put forth detailed instructions for how men and women were expected
to behave in public. Women in particular met strict regulations regarding decorum. In A Father’s
Legacy to his Daughters (1774), John Gregory purports that women should be “silent in
company, especially in a large one,” and have “an easy dignity in [their] behaviour at public
places, but not that confident ease, that unabashed countenance, which seems to set the company
at defiance” (28). Gregory also declares, “One of the chief beauties in a female character, is that
modest reserve, that retiring delicacy, which avoids the public eye” (26). Yet he contradicts
himself: “I wish you”—women—“to have great ease and openness in your conversation” (37).
How can a woman converse easily and openly and be “silent in company”? Gregory’s
abhorrence of “Wit…the most dangerous talent you can possess,” further quells the female’s
ability to participate actively in social exchanges, especially with men, around whom she must
“be guarded with great discretion and good nature” (30). The demands of conduct books such as
Gregory’s oppose concurrent pressures on women to be “accomplished,” an appellation that
denotes exhibiting the performative skills of music, dance, and elocution. That nineteenthcentury standards pressured women to be both discreet in public and talented in performance arts
demonstrates the impracticality of society’s expectations for women to be everything at once. A
woman was not allowed to be just quiet; she must be quiet and sociable and willing to perform.
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She was required to mold her personality to suit the expectations of her social context—whether
to make herself affable or to minimize her presence—so as to avoid being socially branded as
cold and standoffish or, worse, a flirt.
On the other hand, conduct books written for men present unique instructions that plainly
favor assertive sociability over reserved detachment, as is evidenced in Lord Chesterfield’s
Advice to His Son, On Men and Manners (1775). In this manual, Lord Chesterfield devotes
several pages to denouncing bashfulness: he claims, “we [men] make ourselves contemptible, if
we cannot come into a room and speak to people without being out of countenance, or without
embarrassment. A man who is really diffident, timid, and bashful, be his merit what it will, never
can push himself in the world; his despondency throws him into inaction, and the forward, the
bustling, and the petulant will always precede him” (9). Furthermore, Chesterfield implies that
the man who makes himself approachable will surpass the man who doesn’t in both “business
[and] pleasure” (3). Lord Chesterfield does acknowledge the risk of being too sociable, but he
undoubtedly prefers for a man to be forward and outgoing rather than aloof. The inconsistencies
in nineteenth-century society’s standards for decorum in both men and women placed strains on
individuals’ abilities to read each other’s minds; ambiguities in the “rules” obfuscated when one
was being genuine versus erecting a façade or succumbing to external pressures. The patterns of
these expectations and the communicative errors that result from failing to fit in to those patterns
constitute a frequent theme in nineteenth-century novels. I am particularly concerned in this
investigation with novels by Jane Austen, Charlotte Brontë, and George Eliot. Astutely attentive
to internal psychological operations and social interactions among men and women, these three
women authors ably crafted narratives that depict and critique their own society’s highly
gendered standards regarding social performance and reticence.
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The expected behaviors regarding sociability and restraint put forth in nineteenth-century
conduct books parallel the inherent personality traits of extroversion and introversion.
Dispositions inevitably influence behaviors and actions, and when dispositions conflict with
class- and gender-based standards for behavior, misunderstandings occur. Introverts, for
instance, typically resist the behavior of socializing, while extroverts struggle with social
restraint. Both conflicts of interest place unique pressures on introverts and extroverts to present
public façades that disagree with their natural temperaments. It is when individuals fail to
conform to set expectations that their behaviors are misunderstood as representing a personality
that is untrue to their genuine natures. The introvert who refrains from social engagement may be
unfairly judged as aloof or standoffish, and the extrovert whose expressive inclinations turn
projecting bashfulness into a chore may be judged as gregarious and pleasure-seeking. Not until
readers and fellow characters grow sufficiently acquainted with a character are they able to judge
when that character’s behaviors accurately reflect his or her disposition. As such, it is critical for
readers to be alert for when characters may be misreading each other as well as to be willing to
revise their own (potentially mis-) understandings of characters.
Carl Jung standardized the use of the terms “extraversion” and “introversion” in his 1921
work, Psychological Types (published in English in 1923), after which Katharine Briggs and
Isabel Briggs Meyers popularized the typology in developing the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
(first published in 1962). However, the terms and concepts date back to the seventeenth century.
The Oxford English Dictionary cites Thomas Blount’s Glossographia; or, A dictionary
interpreting all such hard words, whether Hebrew, Greek or Latin…as are now used in our
refined English tongue, published in 1656, as the first occurrence of the term “extroversion,”
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which it defined as “scattering or distracting one’s thoughts upon exterior objects.”1 The first
occurrence of “introversion” arose in Thomas Gataker’s A discours apologetical in 1654 with a
religious connotation associated with fasting and praying.2 Introversion is here defined as the
“action of turning the thoughts inward, i.e. to one’s own mind or soul, or to the contemplation of
inward or spiritual things” (OED).3 This brief study of early recorded uses of the terminology
demonstrates that the binary of seeking stimulation or turning one’s thoughts internally versus
externally was articulated long before the nineteenth century, laying the foundation for Jung’s
work in the field of human psychology. Jung’s Psychological Types offers an in-depth
explication of how these centuries-old terms can be applied to individual human personality
types and provides a contextual springboard from which the literary critic can explore character
personality types. Jung’s typology, though it postdates the nineteenth-century novels in question,
provides a thoroughly informative paratextual backdrop and offers a parallel modern vocabulary
for exploring the period-specific dichotomy of social performance and reticence.
Cognitive narrative theory and its methodologies help readers negotiate the distinction
between the earlier emphasis on behaviors and the contemporary focus on inclinations by
enabling them to piece together a character’s physical and mental actions to construct notions of
his or her identity. Applications of cognitive narrative theory illuminate how nineteenth-century
novelists convey their understandings of different human temperaments and how those
temperaments influence social interactions in a stringently regimented society. I chiefly engage
with the work of Alan Palmer and Lisa Zunshine in my efforts to analyze individual character
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The first occurrence of “extraversion,” an alternate spelling of the term, is found in Robert Boyle’s Exper.
Particular Qual. in 1675, though this spelling is now considered obsolete and rare (OED).
2	
  No entries were found for an alternate spelling of “introversion.”	
  
3
The use of “extrovert” and “introvert” as verbs also dates to the mid-seventeenth century (1671 and 1669,
respectively), though the use of these terms as nouns does not regularize until the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries (1918 and 1883, respectively; OED). The first occurrence of the alternate spelling of “extravert” (obs.)
used as a verb dates 1669 (OED). There is no alternate spelling for “introvert” as a verb, and neither term has an
alternate spelling for its noun form.
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personalities and the mental interactions that occur amongst multiple minds. Specifically, in
Social Minds in the Novel (2010), Palmer develops the binary of internalist and externalist
perspectives to differentiate between the mental perspective that “stresses those aspects that are
inner, introspective, private, solitary, individual” and the perspective that “stresses those aspects
that are outer, active, public, social,” respectively (39).4 Palmer explains that the internalist’s
mind is psychologically mysterious, detached from social interaction, and passive, therefore
requiring “highly verbalized thought” as a means of communication (39). On the other hand, the
externalist’s mind is “behavioral, evident, embodied, and engaged,” accessible through outward
observations and non-verbal communication (39). Novelists use a variety of narrative strategies
like dialogue, descriptions of action and body language, omniscient descriptions of thought, and
first-person narrator reflections to represent and convey these mental perspectives. The introvert
predominantly operates through an internalist perspective, directing thought and energy inwards
in a way that limits his or her psychological and emotional visibility, while the extrovert’s mind
is more externally available as a result of directing mental and physical energy outward and thus
being more “readable” through body language and other unspoken cues. This distinction between
private and public mentalities lays the groundwork for a theoretical examination of the
introversion – extroversion dichotomy in nineteenth-century fictions.
Palmer suggests that traditional cognitive narratology has heretofore placed a heavier
emphasis on the internalist perspective than the externalist perspective and aims to rectify this
imbalance through his central and, within the field of cognitive narratology, controversial thesis
that “much of our thought is visible” (4). Palmer uses the term social minds to describe “those
aspects of the whole mind that are revealed through the externalist perspective,” aspects that are
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See Palmer’s introduction to Fictional Minds (2004) for a description of Colwyn Trevarthen’s work on the
subjective first and the intersubjective first, topics that inspired the development of his internalist and externalist
dichotomy (5).
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physically embodied and readily available for interpretation (39). A related method of discussing
mental interpretation is through the concepts of mindreading and theory of mind, which Zunshine
defines as “our evolved cognitive adaptation for explaining people’s behavior in terms of their
mental states, such as thoughts, desires, feelings, and intentions” (“Cognitive Alternatives to
Interiority” 147). Examining how different minds communicate nonverbally as well as verbally
enables the construction of a nuanced interpretation of a character’s psychological identity.
Furthermore, recognizing how “a fictional character [is] aware of her reflection in the minds of
others” as well as in her own mind constitutes “one strategy for making [readers] perceive her as
having interiority” or internal self-awareness, the key to understanding characters’ self-identities
(160). The necessity of combining a character’s self-representation with perceptions held by
fellow characters implies that the internalist and externalist perspectives are ultimately
inseparable and codependent; Zunshine writes, “[f]ictional interiority is…a social phenomenon”
(161). Social cognition cannot occur without a collection of individual cognitive entities. As
such, an investigation of introverted and extroverted minds calls for thorough consideration of
how the independent mind interacts with other minds. Herein lies the core of my exploration of
how different psychological dispositions determine a character’s relative “readability” and the
consequences of not molding one’s dispositions to the nineteenth-century social context.
I have chosen to explore these cognitive phenomena through close readings of the
characters of Lucy Snowe in Charlotte Brontë’s Villette (1853) and Mr. Darcy and Jane Bennett
in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice (1813). I have also sketched what a similar investigation
would look like of Philip Wakem from George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss (1860). Modern
scholarship abounds with critical analyses of these characters, but none has applied the
psychological dichotomy of introversion and extroversion to their fictional personalities.
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Scholars such as Nancy Armstrong, Michael Curtin, Mary Poovey, Elizabeth Langland, and
Maggie Lane have done edifying work on the state and social consequences of nineteenthcentury British standards for social conduct and reticence as they are represented in the time
period’s novels, but the relationship between character dispositions and characters’ abilities to
operate according to these standards has not yet been investigated. However, Patricia Meyer
Spacks, in her introduction to Sense and Sensibility (1811), foregrounds this discussion through
her insightful study of the qualities of “sense” and “sensibility” as the terms were understood in
Austen’s nineteenth-century context. “Sense” retains its nineteenth-century connotation today,
but “sensibility” in Austen’s time “referred to a then current version of emotional extravagance,”
the show of which “many thought, could too readily replace enacted compassion or social
responsibility—proclaimed feeling substituting for action” (1-2). Spacks then elucidates how
Austen introduces the novel’s two sisters as apparent “psychological opposites,” Marianne
“celebrat[ing] the life of emotional intensity” and driven by sensibility while Elinor “anchors
[Marianne’s] volatility” with her “common sense” (6). Marianne “conceals nothing, whereas her
sister reveals nothing” (9). Spacks observes that this contrast calls attention to “the difference
between expressiveness and restraint,” a near identical binary to that of social performance and
reticence (9). Although this thesis does not specifically address Sense and Sensibility, I suspect
that a study of introversion and extroversion alongside nineteenth-century understandings of
sense and sensibility in Marianne and Elinor would prove immensely fruitful.
Another salient aspect of Spacks’ introduction is the stress she places on finding balance
between the unique elements of sense and sensibility. She says,
As a tale of two sisters with contrasting modes of confronting the world…Sense
and Sensibility…reveals the insufficiencies both of sense and of sensibility in
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isolation from each other. The capacity to know and to accept one’s own feelings,
and to express them judiciously, can be a source of sustenance. Social demands
must not be allowed to drown out personal ones. The reverse, however, also holds
true: personal demands cannot obviate social ones, and judicious expression of
feeling forbids extravagant outpourings. (31)
This necessity for judiciousness in expressing and containing one’s emotions also rings true for
social performance and reticence. The contradictory instructions in eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury conduct books perhaps unintentionally point to a need for equilibrium between outward
demonstration and inward reservation. One must avoid being too much of one thing and should
negotiate which social contexts call for which behaviors and the presentation of which
personality traits. Such expectations result in frequent performances of falsity as men and women
routinely adjust their public personas irrespective of their private dispositions.
The first chapter of this thesis explores Villette’s Lucy Snowe, a character who uses her
authority as a first-person narrator to construct for her readers an image of a profoundly
introverted woman in order to conceal a more genuinely passionate and extroverted nature. I
argue that Lucy projects a personality that relies entirely on sense to disguise her dispositional
preferences for dramatization, emotional expressivity (“sensibility”), and external or social
stimulation. I then argue that Lucy’s performance of introversion functions both as a personal
defense mechanism for her intense fears of intimacy and loss and as a method of conforming to
nineteenth-century British standards of decorum. The second chapter of this thesis investigates
two introverted characters whose inward-inclining dispositions render them challenging to read
and whose failures to comply with gendered standards for social engagement challenge their
abilities to function normatively in their social environments: Pride and Prejudice’s Mr. Darcy
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holds an aversion for social interaction that makes him appear proud and unlikeable to those who
do not know him, while Jane Bennett’s reservation of feeling, in compliance with the
expectations of her time, results in other characters’ critical misunderstanding of her emotional
desires. That the misreadings of both of these characters on the basis of their introverted natures
are ultimately rectified suggests in Austen a sympathy for those who are misunderstood for
reasons beyond their control and a potential critique of her society’s unjust expectations for men
and women to be simultaneously outgoing and reserved.
Finally, the coda projects an opportunity for a unique investigation of how introverted
and extroverted characters function in nineteenth-century novels. While Lucy Snowe, Mr. Darcy,
and Jane Bennett all possess the ability to manipulate their public personas, Philip Wakem of
George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss is, I suggest, resigned to a life of introversion by his
physical disability and the effect his disfigurement has on how others perceive him. Philip’s
physical limitations render him unable to participate in conventional male activities, and his
humpback repulses others. These factors result in his social isolation, forcing him to seek
happiness internally rather than externally. A regretfully under-studied character, Philip Wakem
offers scholars much to examine as a liminal figure in the binaristic introversion – extroversion
distinction. Together, Brontë’s Villette, Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, and Eliot’s The Mill on
the Floss offer just a few of the many nineteenth-century British characters who are ripe for
exploration through the psychological and behavioral lenses described above. I hope the insights
presented here open further discussion of the role of the novel genre in purveying or critiquing
nineteenth-century expectations regarding introversion and extroversion.
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Chapter One
“A Personage in Disguise”: The Performance of Introversion in Charlotte Brontë’s Villette

Seldom is a nineteenth-century British protagonist equipped with as little personal history
as is Lucy Snowe of Charlotte Brontë’s 1853 novel, Villette. All readers learn about Lucy’s
existence prior to the first event of the narrative’s plot is that as “a girl” she visited Bretton
“about twice a year” (7). Then, all readers are told about the events leading up to the beginning
of her narrative is that Lucy’s godmother sensed eminent events “whose very shadow” Lucy
could not anticipate and as a result came “in person to claim [Lucy] of the kinsfolk with whom
was at that time fixed [her] permanent residence” (7-8). Disclosing no details, Lucy experienced
an “unsettled sadness,” suggesting to readers the occurrence of a family tragedy even she does
not fully understand and reflecting her resultant “unsettled” status in the Bretton household.
Lucy’s reflections from this time, though favorable about her visits to Bretton, focus on the
house’s “quiet…atmosphere” and “clean…pavement,” revealing Lucy’s serene and remarkably
adult-like temperament during her childhood (7). Only the superficial reader, however, would
not feel a bit uneasy about the absence of emotional reaction to such displacement, even if
Lucy’s origins are never explained. The striking contrast between her reticence about her origins
and the abundance of emotional reflection later in the novel points to a conflict within the
dichotomy between introversion and extroversion; Lucy exploits her narrational authority to craft
the image of an introverted woman that disguises a more authentic extroverted and social nature.
She decides as narrator to conceal her background and construct a self-identity that enables her
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to cope with emotional hardship and present a façade to her readers that aligns with class-based
standards of propriety and reservation.
The contradictions between the character Lucy is and the character Lucy presents to her
readers and fellow characters are often a result of Lucy’s staunch efforts to control or suppress
her passions with clear reasoning. Lucy takes pains to explain and rationalize to her readers (and
sometimes herself) that she is reserved, “lik[ing] peace so well, and s[eeking] stimulus so little,
that when the latter came [she] almost felt it a disturbance” (8). Later, Lucy contrasts Polly’s
experience of “endured agony” at her father’s leaving and the tender responses of Mrs. Bretton
and Graham to Polly’s grief with her claim, “I, Lucy Snowe, was calm” (25). She insists on
being viewed as rational and controlled, not prone to emotional outbursts or violent passions.
However, I argue that the fact that Lucy must explain to her readers that she is an introvert
indicates that she is in fact constructing a façade to conceal a more extroverted, outwardpleasure-seeking disposition than she finds acceptable for reasons of personal self-protection and
social adaptability. Multiple perusals of the novel provide further evidence of Lucy’s
extroversion in her actions and interactions with others despite her attempts to paint herself as an
introvert. Though Lucy does not explicate her motivations for this pattern of self-representation,
I suggest that these efforts serve both as a coping mechanism for her utter aloneness and as a
veneer behind which she can operate discreetly in Victorian society.
Another useful way to examine this division in Lucy’s identity between her introverted
rationale of extroverted tendencies is to examine differences in critics’ perceptions of Lucy as a
character vs. perceptions of Lucy as a narrator. In twentieth and twenty-first-century scholarship,
Lucy’s character is repeatedly described as “reticen[t],” “passive,” “calm and reasonable,”
“stern,” “prudish,” and other terms synonymous with being quiet and reserved (Lawrence 452,
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Colby 414, Rabinowitz 249, Peel 233, Kent 335). Rachel Brownstein goes so far as to call her
“faceless”; Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar characterize her as “a woman without—outside
society, without parents or friends, without physical or mental attractions, without money or
confidence or health,” someone who is “[s]ilent, invisible,…frigid, spiritless” (Brownstein 162,
Gilbert and Gubar 400). Such attributions typify readers’ initial understandings of Lucy’s
character as that of a soft-spoken though independent woman whose debilitating interiority
isolates her from her surroundings, willingly and/or circumstantially. However, a look at
descriptions of Lucy’s narrational style—as opposed to her character or disposition—reveals a
class of adjectives of a rather different nature: as a narrator, Lucy is labeled “problematic,”
“mislead[ing]…evasi[ve],” even “rebarbative” (Cooper xxxii, Gilbert and Gubar 418-9, Green
223). Though often (not always) bearing a negative connotation, these descriptors paint Lucy the
narrator as more active than Lucy the character, a supposedly passive observer and sufferer.
Herein lies the challenge of negotiating Lucy’s nature: readers must parse these conflicting
notions of Lucy’s identity as the protagonist of her own first-person narrative to construct a
cohesive view of her fictional mind.
An application of James Phelan and Peter Rabinowitz’s rhetorical approach to narrative
theory helps readers decipher their understandings of Lucy as a character from those of Lucy as a
narrator. Phelan and Rabinowitz differentiate between “dimensions and functions of character—
that is,…the attributes that serve as the building blocks of character and the coalescence of those
attributes into a larger entity” (113-4). The building blocks of Lucy’s character are those bits of
information she shares about herself (predominantly consisting of introverted qualities), but the
function of her character coalesces into a markedly more extroverted psychology once readers
have pieced together the various components of her narration. Phelan and Rabinowitz
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acknowledge that a character’s dimensions and functions may not always work in tandem; in
such cases, I suggest that thorough character analysis requires simultaneous consideration of
what dimensions are narrated alongside how those dimensions function in the narration.
Therefore, readers must look beyond their cursory perceptions of Lucy’s character as an
introvert, which are based primarily on what Lucy tells, and instead direct their attention to her
rhetoric, that is, how she tells. In so comparing Lucy’s observational reports with her rhetorical
maneuvers and her actions themselves (invoking the classic showing vs. telling dichotomy),
readers will be better equipped to weigh her representations of plot against her retrospective
psychological reflections to assemble and evaluate her covertly extroverted identity.
An understanding of the paradox of self-knowledge, the patent inability of one individual
to represent him or herself sufficiently to an audience, contributes to understanding how readers
engage with the text of Villette to parse a coherent understanding of Lucy’s mind. Carl Jung says,
“[j]udgment in relation to one’s own personality is indeed always extraordinarily crowded,” as
one is constantly engaged in an “effort to maintain psychic equilibrium” (10). Put simply, Jung
calls into question just how well one can know one’s self. Within a fictional context, a literary
critic must then ask how well a first-person narrator can represent his or her own story. Pairing
this inquiry with the issues of disclosure that become apparent throughout the novel naturally
excites discussion of Lucy’s unreliability; while this is a dialogue worth having, for the purposes
of this endeavor, I feel that entering into such a dialogue would distract from the more central
argument of this paper.1 Instead, I am interested in deconstructing and reconstructing Lucy’s
identity through analysis of not only her self-descriptions, which readers cannot fully trust, but
also her representations of how others perceive and interact with her. Alan Palmer’s concepts of
situated identity, aspectuality, and continuing-consciousness frames will facilitate this effort. By
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For discussions of unreliability in Villette, see Mary Jacobus (1979) and Nancy Sorkin Rabinowitz (1985).
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analyzing relationships with characters like Ginevra, Lucy’s colleagues, Dr. John, and M. Paul,
readers will see that although most characters read Lucy at her fabricated face value, the one
closest to her at the end of the novel sees a different woman, the woman I believe is the “real”
Lucy. In order to demonstrate how Lucy’s determination to hide her true nature situates her
readers under a false pretense of introversion, I will closely examine her narrated selfdescriptions in contrast to her observations of how others perceive her nature and her actions.
Insofar as readers wish to pin down Lucy’s “authentic” identity, Palmer’s concept of
situated identity becomes immensely valuable. The notion of a situated identity balances in
readers’ minds the differences between Lucy’s self-descriptions with her descriptions of how
others perceive her in creating a rounded understanding of her personality. In Fictional Minds
(2004), Palmer echoes the earlier-mentioned notion of the paradox of self-knowledge, asking, “If
you want to find out about an aspect of someone’s mind, say whether or not they are selfish, who
do you ask? Certainly not just them, because you know that you cannot be sure that you will get
a complete answer. Selfish people are not likely to admit to being selfish” (168). Similarly, Lucy
is not likely to admit to having extroverted tendencies that might classify her alongside the likes
of Mrs. Home or Miss Fanshawe. Therefore, readers must look into the perceptions of other
characters in order to “situate” Lucy’s identity within a more reliable social context.2 This
situating process occurs through what Palmer terms the continuing-consciousness frame, “the
ability to take a reference to a character in the text and attach to it a presumed consciousness that
exists continuously within the storyworld” (Social Minds 10). In other words, the reader
compiles and integrates every mental moment or plot action that refers to a specific character to
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  It

would be negligent not to note that given the novel’s first-person narration, Lucy’s understanding of how others
perceive her is limited; readers are only given Lucy’s representations of others’ perceptions of her, which
jeopardizes the level of reliability that might be achieved through a third-person omniscient narrator. However, I
venture to argue that many of Lucy’s observations of other characters’ perceptions double as some of her most frank
self-assessments and consequently enable more than limit readers’ constructions of her identity.	
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generate a coherent understanding of that character’s fictional mind; what results is a cognitive
narrative (Social Minds 12). Palmer’s continuing-consciousness frame enables readers to
formulate Lucy’s cognitive narrative within the context of introversion and extroversion.
Lucy’s construction of an introverted disguise originated from necessity. Her placement
in Bretton, a house that would never become her home, played a crucial role in the development
of her need to construct an introverted persona by forcing her at a young age to learn to exist on
her own, both physically and psychologically. Karen Lawrence astutely points out how the first
event of the novel’s plot draws attention to Lucy’s homelessness. Lawrence says, it is “selfconsciously that the plot begins with an intruding letter…Lucy thinks the letter might be ‘from
home’…but instead…Lucy receives a letter from ‘Home,’ that is Mr. Home, announcing the
arrival of Polly, ‘a second guest’…reminding us that Lucy is the first” (459). Lucy is then further
removed from her place as “[o]ne child in a household of grown people” upon Polly’s arrival
(Brontë 7). The added competition of a younger girl whose active emotional needs outweigh
Lucy’s passive existence further diminishes Lucy’s status in relation to both the physical space
she occupies (she must now share her room) and the social role she plays in the household (Polly
is preferred by both Mrs. Bretton and, of course, Graham). Despite such diminution, Lucy finds
in Polly an outlet for the emotions she herself suppresses. Multiple scholars have pointed to Polly
as something of an alter ego for Lucy (see Gilbert and Gubar, for instance), an argument to
which I would add that Polly becomes a figure through which Lucy, who insists upon being in
control of herself at all times, can express passions that she refuses to accept within herself. For
instance, Lucy observes Polly’s profound anguish upon temporarily losing her father and yet
sheds not a tear of her own in response to the loss of her family and home. Lucy’s fascination
with Polly’s weeping and other coping techniques not only demonstrates voyeuristic tendencies
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but also hints at an emotional gap in Lucy’s personality in that she is either unable to react as
Polly does or actively chooses not to.
Lucy’s repression of openly expressive reactions to tragic events points to an intense fear
of experiencing emotional hurt, offering yet another reason for reverting inwards to hide behind
her introverted façade. Evidence of this fear emerges during Lucy’s time caring for Miss
Marchmont early in the novel. Specifically, when the crippled woman is approaching death and
Lucy realizes she may have to leave the comfort and regularity of Miss Marchmont’s company,
she says, “I had wanted to compromise with Fate: to escape occasional great agonies by
submitting to a whole life of privation and small pains. Fate would not so be pacified; nor would
Providence sanction this shrinking sloth and cowardly indolence” (42). Lucy openly admits to
dreading “great agonies,” presumably those that result from incurring the risk of vulnerability
inherent in the experience of emotional intimacy, but she scolds herself as a coward for seeking
the security from pain that can only be achieved through solitude. That working for Miss
Marchmont limits Lucy’s access to the social world creates in Miss Marchmont’s home a safe
haven in which Lucy adapts to the restrictions of her new occupation by embracing introverted
behaviors such as taking pleasure in solitary pastimes and seeking happiness internally rather
than materially. So doing provides Lucy with a reliable mechanism for coping with her isolation
and masking her fear of social vulnerability.
Despite the comfort Lucy claims to find in solitude, readers occasionally find that she has
to convince herself that being alone is acceptable, both for herself and society. In these moments,
Lucy rationalizes herself out of her discomfort with seclusion, exposing an intrinsic though
suppressed yearning for company. First, while traveling to France, Lucy finds herself alone on
the boat’s deck for hours, which she passed in a “tranquil, and even happy mood” before
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remembering her “hazardous – some would have said hopeless – character” (62). She says,
quoting Richard Lovelace, “I feel that, as—Stone walls do not a prison make, / Nor iron bars—a
cage, so peril, loneliness, an uncertain future, are not oppressive evils, so long as the frame is
healthy and the faculties are employed” (62). Just as fear of loneliness begins to set in, Lucy
consciously reasons with herself that she is not imprisoned by her solitude. I suggest that the true
introvert would not articulate such a thought and instead would welcome the privacy. Later, at
the Rue Fossette, Lucy rationalizes her seclusion a second time: “The whole day did I wander or
sit…alone, finding…a sort of companionship in my own thoughts. I well remember that I
exchanged but two sentences that day with any living being: not that I felt solitary; I was glad to
be quiet” (143). “Not that I felt solitary,” she says. Lucy again interrupts her narration with a
statement that renders her external situation emotionally acceptable by recasting loneliness and
isolation as peaceful quiet. In fact, she purports to hardly be alone, as her own thoughts provide
her with “a sort of companionship.” Lucy’s defensiveness prepares readers for the upcoming
summer she spends alone at the school during which she sinks into a relentless depression; then,
her rationale no longer suffices to help her cope with the intensity of her seclusion.
Later in the novel, when Lucy finds herself returned to Mrs. Bretton’s caring hands
following a mental breakdown occasioned by actual isolation, Lucy expresses most eloquently
her deep need for and simultaneous fear of friendship. She says,
I felt that I still had friends. Friends, not professing vehement attachment, not
offering the tender solace of well-matched and congenial relationship; on whom,
therefore, but moderate demand of affection was to be made, of whom but
moderate expectation formed; but towards whom my heart softened instinctively,
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and yearned with an importunate gratitude, which I entreated Reason betimes to
check.
“Do not let me think of them too often, too much, too fondly,” I implored:
“let me be content with a temperate draught of this living stream: let me not run
athirst, and apply passionately to its welcome waters: let me not imagine in them
a sweeter taste than earth’s fountains know. Oh! would to God I may be enabled
to feel enough sustained by an occasional, amicable intercourse, rare, brief,
unengrossing and tranquil: quite tranquil!”
Still repeating this word, I turned to my pillow; and still repeating it, I
steeped that pillow with tears. (199)
This passage speaks volumes for Lucy’s character. In a poignantly honest voice, she expresses
her gratitude for the society of a few individuals who value her as a person worthy of care and
affection; yet, in her mind, Lucy stifles this friendship. Rather than embracing Mrs. Bretton and
Graham as companions, she prays to God not to “let [her] think of them too often, too much, too
fondly,” in order that she will not lose herself in her emotions and crave undeserved attention.
She then prays that God will keep her from “run[ning] athirst” and will permit acquaintanceship
to suffice in “sustain[ing]” and nourishing her spirit. She finally prays for the power to maintain
her independence so as to never open herself up to the pain of loss. Herein lies one of Lucy’s
primary motivators for building her façade of introversion as a coping mechanism for the self.
The loss Lucy experienced in her childhood likely occasioned more pain than she has shared
with readers, and her suppression manifests itself in her adulthood fear of closeness.
A secondary reason for erecting her wall of introversion is that Lucy holds strong views
against opposite, extroverted behaviors in other women. Whether out of envy or genuine distaste,
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Lucy on multiple occasions expresses a prejudice against women who present frivolous,
flirtatious, or excessively social manners. On the third page of the book, she ascribes Mrs. Home,
Polly’s now-deceased mother, the personality of a “very pretty, but a giddy, careless woman;”
Lucy hears that Mrs. Home died from “over-exert[ing] herself at a ball;” and even Mrs. Bretton
expresses her wish that Polly will not turn out like her “mamma; as silly and frivolous a little flirt
as ever sensible man was weak enough to marry” (9). Mrs. Home is called a “butterfly woman,”
a butterfly being, according to the OED, a “vain, gaudily attired…light-headed, inconstant
person” (9). The utter lack of respect in these descriptions of Mrs. Home illustrates Lucy’s
condescension and distrust of women with extroverted proclivities. Additionally, moments in
Lucy’s relationship with Ginevra expose resentment of girls “of Ginevra Fanshawe’s light,
careless temperament” for their “vapid[ity],” and “vain coquett[ishness]” (63, 94, 96). In some
cases, her bias against this particular stereotype of extroverts (female coquettes) appears socially
engrained in her by English standards as they contrast culturally with the French-speaking town
of Villette: Lucy scorns the Parisienne teacher at school, as she “mortally hated work, and loved
what she called pleasure; being an insipid, heartless, brainless dissipation of time” (140). By
casting herself opposite these vain, frivolous women, Lucy enhances her own image as a serious,
reserved woman. The elitism imbued in her characterizations compensates for the existence of
her own related qualities and desires for social activity.
One consequence of Lucy’s cold, distancing façade is that it prevents most characters
from attempting to dig deeper than her superficial presentation. She successfully convinces most
of her fellow characters to perceive her as the introverted individual she has constructed, though
different characters interpret her reticence uniquely. Lucy admits, “What contradictory attributes
of character we sometimes find ascribed to us, according to the eye with which we are viewed!”
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(334). As a result, when piecing together Lucy’s cognitive narrative, readers must consider each
perceiver’s aspect, or the perspective from which they view Lucy. This concept of aspectuality,
the idea that “storyworlds are always experienced under some aspects and not others by the
characters who inhabit them,” is a kind of reader-response theory for interpreting individual
characters rather than entire texts (Social Minds 40). Therefore, because readers cannot fully
trust Lucy’s first-person account of herself, they must consider each character’s evaluation of her
(as represented through Lucy’s narration) within the context of the nature of that character’s
relationship with Lucy and the environment in which the relationship occurs. So doing will take
into account any biases fellow characters may hold against the individual in question.
One demonstrative example of a character with a limited aspect with regard to Lucy is
Ginevra Fanshawe, who is painfully (for the reader, not Lucy) honest about her perception of
Villette’s protagonist. During Madame Beck’s fête, Ginevra tells Lucy that she “would not be
you for a kingdom,” in response to which Lucy is nonplussed; she rarely takes Ginevra seriously
(160). Ginevra compares them further, “see how happy am I, and how miserable are you”:
I am the daughter of a gentleman of family, and though my father is not rich, I
have expectations from an uncle. Then, I am just eighteen, the finest age possible.
I have had a continental education, and though I can’t spell, I have abundant
accomplishments. I am pretty; you can’t deny that; I may have as many admirers
as I choose. This very night I have been breaking the hearts of two
gentlemen,….There is me—happy ME; now for you, poor soul!
I suppose you are nobody's daughter, since you took care of little children
when you first came to Villette: you have no relations; you can't call yourself
young at twenty-three; you have no attractive accomplishments—no beauty. As to
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admirers, you hardly know what they are;….I believe you never were in love, and
never will be: you don't know the feeling, and so much the better, for though you
might have your own heart broken, no living heart will you ever break. Isn't it all
true? (160)
Lucy denies nothing, even commends Ginevra for her “shrewd[ness]” and honesty (161). Before
accepting everything Ginevra says as true, however, readers must take into account her
individual aspect: under what circumstances do the two characters interact? Lucy repeatedly
shuns Ginevra’s shallow, frivolous conversation, yet Ginevra persists in adopting Lucy as a
confidante. The two often spend time together, but always by Ginevra’s initiation and always for
the purpose of Lucy listening to Ginevra’s concerns about courtship or how beautiful she is. That
Lucy is reluctant to engage in Ginevra’s chosen topics of conversation establishes Ginevra’s
perception of Lucy as a woman miserable and forever without love. While Ginevra’s aspect is
limited to a specific type of exchange, the above confrontation nevertheless leads readers to
consider this element of Lucy’s personality, that of being incapable of loving or being loved.
Now that Ginevra has announced the possibility (and Lucy has readily agreed), readers must
incorporate the notion into their development of Lucy’s situated identity as a false introvert.
Ginevra Fanshawe is not alone in her perception of Lucy as an unhappy outsider. Lucy’s
fellow teachers at the Rue Fossette all see her as bookish, a stereotypical perception of introverts.
Lucy says, “Madame Beck herself deemed me a regular bas-bleu,” an expression that translates
to “bluestocking” and is a term used in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries3 to describe
scholarly women, arguably a period-specific form of female introversion (261). Lucy continues
to explain how Madame Beck “often and solemnly used to warn me not to study too much, lest
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Gary Kelly confirms, “Bluestocking feminism…had roots in the seventeenth century,…was fully developed among
a small group of women and men in the third quarter of the eighteenth century, and…was diffused more widely
through the late eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth century in England” (163).
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‘the blood should all go to my head.’ Indeed, everybody in the Rue Fossette held a superstition
that ‘Meess Lucie’ was learned; with the notable exception of M. Emanuel,” whose perception of
Lucy I will discuss shortly (261). Nineteenth-century American obstetrician Charles Meigs, in
his 1867 work, Obstetrics, The Science and the Art, explicates the predominant medical belief
(clearly shared by Madame Beck) that young women who studied too much were rendered
infertile by a cessation of menstruation as a result of the blood flow being directed to the brain
rather than the uterus.4 Put coarsely, a woman who read “too much” ceased to be a woman. Thus,
Lucy suggests that her colleagues, like Ginevra, desexualize her on the basis of her “bas-bleu”
status into an entity incapable of romance, marriage, or motherhood. Their reading of Lucy is
based on their aspect of seeing her always in the role of a teacher or as a peer who sits quietly
while the other women gossip about their romantic exploits. Despite elements of truth in how the
women view her, Lucy steers her readers away from trusting their perceptions both by mocking
their French pronunciation of her name and by stating, “[t]hus does the world give us credit for
merits we have not” (261). Lucy projects an image of the studious, intellectual introvert but then
resents that she is successful in so misdirecting her perceivers, for she does not self-award the
“merit” of studiousness. This contradiction suggests that her true affinities lie elsewhere than
buried in a book, something she yearns for someone to acknowledge.
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Meigs states, “As to the young girl—a young female who has been brought up at home in the country, is rarely
sent to a boarding-school to finish her education without soon finding herself the subject of a catamenial
derangement. She may have been perfectly regular at home; but soon after she takes her place upon the school-form
and daily devotes many hours to study, the menses are apt to be suspended, and to remain suspended until she leaves
the school, and ceases to consume her nerve-force in those mental or intellectual operations, that require for their
effectuation all the biotic power she is capable of evolving. The consumption of this force leaves her destitute both
of the power and the necessity to discharge the menstrual blood; not depriving her, meanwhile, of the force required
to fulfil the true physiological office, the ripening, to wit, and the discharging of her monthly ovulum from the
stroma. Her ovulation goes on regularly, and she is well, though not apparently menstruous. I have found many
young women thus affected; but…I have not ventured to interfere beyond the interference of recommending a
lessened devotion to mental labor, a more abundant and exciting diet, and a proper amount of daily exercise in the
free air. Such amenorrhœas cease as soon as the girl leaves school” (155). Helen Cooper similarly explains how
“[n]ineteenth-century medical belief had it that if a woman studied or read too much her blood would drain from her
womb, where it was needed for reproduction, into her head, leaving her barren” (577n10).
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The men in Lucy’s life, excepting one, share similar perceptions of her as something of a
bookworm, shy and reserved. Lucy perceives how Mr. Home, for instance, esteems her “a model
teacher, the essence of the sedate and discreet: somewhat conventional, perhaps, too strict,
limited, and scrupulous, but still the pink and pattern of governess-correctness” (334). In other
words, one version of a stereotypical introvert. Dr. John views her in similarly dry terms, though
he has a very different relationship with Lucy. Contrary to her desires, Dr. John views Lucy as
only a friend and patient. That he is unable to be attracted to her in the way she wishes again
negates Lucy’s viability as a woman. This negation is not entirely out of Lucy’s control,
however. Knowing him from an early age, Lucy is aware that Graham would not be attracted to
her and so constructed her persona into a woman she knew he would not desire romantically, not
as a way of preventing his attraction, but with full knowledge that she would not attract him.
Addressing herself, Lucy says, “Dr. John Bretton knows you only as ‘quiet Lucy’—‘a creature
inoffensive as a shadow;’ he has said, and you have heard him say it: ‘Lucy’s disadvantages
spring from over-gravity in tastes and manner—want of colour in character and costume’” (371).
Lucy’s façade of introversion fades her into the background as “only” a “shadow,” rendering her,
in her own self-descriptions and in the eyes of Dr. John, Ginevra, and the women of the school, a
mere “looker-on” with an “overcast…nature…a subdued habit” (143, 330-1). This consequence
functions as part of her self-protective front, yet none of these relationships give Lucy the
emotional fulfillment that comes only from being with someone who is able to see beyond the
façade. Lucy’s persona, in perhaps overemphasizing the desired quality of reticence, thus
unintentionally invites the neglect that sinks her into depression.
Gradually, and perhaps unexpectedly, however, M. Paul grows into the single individual
who can provide Lucy with the emotional fulfillment she needs to recover from her misery. From
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his first entrance into the novel, he has natural insight into Lucy’s demeanor that elucidates her
extroverted proclivities despite efforts to appear reserved, contemplative, and composed. Upon
Lucy’s arrival at the Rue Fossette, M. Paul is called upon to read her physiognomy, at which
point Lucy observes a “resolute compression of the lips, and a gathering of the brow, [that]
seemed to say that he meant to see through me, and that a veil would be no veil for him” (73).
This observation first indicates that Lucy has a veil and is attempting not to reveal anything
objectionable, yet this man will somehow be impervious to it. Second, her remark foreshadows
M. Paul’s pending status as the one character who will penetrate any mask she dons. In his initial
evaluation of Lucy, M. Paul reports to Madame Beck the presence of a combination of good and
bad things in her countenance and, after asking a string of questions (“‘She is a stranger?... She
speaks French?... She understands it?’”), the “arbiter of [her] destiny” states, “‘Engage her. If
good predominates in that nature, the action will bring its own reward; if evil – eh bien! ma
cousine, ce sera toujours une bonne oeuvre,’” or “well cousin, it will always be a good deed”
(74). Upon this first encounter with M. Paul, readers have no instruction for interpreting his
vague words; nor does Lucy. The prescience of his appraisal, however, compounded with Lucy’s
preliminary observation of his keen abilities of penetration, lay the foundation for M. Paul as a
source of insight into Lucy’s psychology. As the novel progresses, this function becomes even
clearer; his increasing intimacy with Lucy lends more and more credence to his perceptions of
this woman he eventually intends to be united with.
Lucy on multiple occasions places her accounts of M. Paul’s perceptions of herself in
direct contrast with her accounts of how others perceive her. These moments accentuate M.
Paul’s uniqueness in ways that both criticize and flatter him, a contradiction that demonstrates
Lucy’s simultaneous fear of and desire for closeness. One such scene occurs after M. Paul scolds
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her for making the watchguard, not knowing he is its intended recipient. Lucy then scolds herself
for her “wicked fondness for worldly vanities,” confessing feeling shame for seeking external,
material pleasure, and then addresses herself: “Who would have thought it? You deemed
yourself a melancholy sober-sides enough!” (370). She confirms her self-attribution as a sedate,
serious “sober-sides” with the external attributions of Miss Fanshawe, M. de Bassompierre, and
Dr. John Bretton (370). She sets up their perceptions of her to highlight the contrast of what she
now finds are M. Paul’s rather unique opinions:
Such are your own and your friends’ impressions; and behold! there starts up a
little man, differing diametrically from all these, roundly charging you with being
too airy and cheery—too volatile and versatile—too flowery and coloury. This
harsh little man—this pitiless censor—gathers up all your poor scattered sins of
vanity…and calls you to account for the lot…. You are well habituated to be
passed by as a shadow in Life’s sunshine: it is a new thing to see one testily lifting
his hand to screen his eyes, because you tease him with an obtrusive ray. (371)
Lucy is bothered that M. Paul’s view of herself differs so dramatically from that of the
introverted personage she has so carefully constructed. The adjectives she ascribes to M. Paul’s
opinion of her—airy, cheery, volatile, versatile, etc.—instead describe a passionate, outgoing,
pleasure-seeking individual, someone who displays the characteristics she disdains in others.
Lucy is also unaccustomed to having her character so acutely analyzed; aside from Ginevra’s
earlier scrutiny of her personality, Lucy emphasizes her status as predominantly an analyzer
through frequent self-descriptions of being a “looker-on” engaging in close character studies of
her peers. This role inversion at once discomfits and arouses Lucy, as is demonstrated through
the mixture of severe language (a “harsh little man” “roundly charg[es]” her with “scattered sins
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of vanity”) juxtaposed with the tranquil and flirtatious metaphor of being the sun’s bright ray
“teas[ing]” M. Paul with her light. Here M. Paul is presented as the one person who “gets” Lucy,
something readers must weigh heavily in their constructions of Lucy’s cognitive narrative.
M. Paul’s unique discernment of Lucy’s psychology leads him to test her boundaries on
multiple occasions. How Lucy responds mentally and physically to those tests, that is, her
actions and subsequent reactions to those actions, illuminates her extroverted qualities where her
self-descriptions alone cover them up. Palmer connects the concept of situated identity with the
question of action, rightly insisting that, “In a sense we are not so much what we say we are, but
what we do. Action is public and so is a fairly reliable, though not infallible, basis on which
other individuals can judge the workings of our minds” (168-9). One representative scene that
demonstrates how M. Paul pushes Lucy out of her comfort zone into a realm that reveals more
about her true inclinations occurs at Madame Beck’s fête, when he requests that she play a part in
the vaudeville. He says, “‘Play you must. I will not have you shrink, or frown, or make the
prude. I read your skull, that night you came; I see your moyens: play you can; play you must’”
(147). Referencing the first night they met, M. Paul insists that Lucy shed her English prudery
and “straitlaced” attitude to instead embrace her “moyens,” or her abilities (147). In response,
Lucy expresses (or feigns) shock: “I gasped, horror-struck. What did the little man mean?” (147).
Then, after castigating the man with a number of insults that I argue were intended to distract the
reader from what follows, she almost immediately decides to hear him out. Once he has listed his
reasons, “[a] thousand objections rushed into [her] mind. The foreign language, the limited time,
the public display…. Inclination recoiled, Ability faltered, Self-respect…trembled” (148). She
expresses numerous reasons for declining, yes, but she accepts remarkably quickly for one who
supposedly abhors public spectacle. Lucy had a similar reaction when Madame Beck asked her

	
  

26	
  

	
  

to teach—she said, “with my usual base habit of cowardice, I shrank into my sloth like a snail
into its shell, and alleged incapacity and impracticability as a pretext to escape action”—and yet
her resolution to go through with it anyways suggests to me a suppressed affinity for the stage
that nineteenth-century English standards taught her is akin to prostitution (84).
Lucy’s dramatic performance at Madame’s fête supports this theory by the sheer
confidence and agency she adopts when all eyes are on her. After a moment of insecurity during
her “first speech,” she overcomes the initial stage fright, and her “voice took its true pitch, and
found its natural tone” (154). Lucy’s word choices, “true” and “natural,” admit to a certain
comfort and sincerity experienced while on stage that contradict the persona she has elsewhere
presented. Lucy fully embodies her role and even “recklessly alter[s] [its] spirit” (155). In
exerting agency over the foppish character she was supposedly terrified of playing, Lucy
undermines her insistent narrational interjections that work to convince her readers that she
loathes theatricality. She reveals those interruptions to be mere projections to hide a personality
trait that delights in rather than refrains from theatrical expression. Lucy admits as much but
immediately tells her reader that she has resolved to suppress the notion permanently:
Cold, reluctant, apprehensive, I had accepted a part to please another: ere long,
warming, becoming interested, taking courage, I acted to please myself. Yet the
next day, when I thought it over, I quite disapproved of these amateur
performances; and…I took a firm resolution, never to be drawn into a similar
affair. A keen relish for dramatic expression had revealed itself as part of my
nature; to cherish and exercise this new-found faculty might gift me with a world
of delight, but it would not do for a mere looker-on at life: the strength and
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longing must be put by; and I put them by, and fastened them in with the lock of a
resolution which neither Time nor Temptation has since picked. (156)
Here, readers see Lucy grapple with the magnetism of the stage and the allure of possibly even
being a talented actress (having discovered a “new-found” faculty). However, she insists that
such inclinations are inconsistent with her existence as “a mere looker-on at life.” The
personality that she has cultivated in herself and in her self-presentation ultimately forces her to
overturn any opposing characteristics, regardless of how it affects her potential for happiness.
However, Lucy’s pledge to abstain from theatricality does not persist. As Katie Peel
highlights in “Performativity in Charlotte Brontë’s Villette,” when Lucy attends a performance
starring Vashti, based on the real-life Rachel Felix, whom Cooper notes was “renowned for
impassioned performances,” she is entranced by the agency and strength of the “stage empress”
(Brontë 579n6, 286). Lucy says, “It was a marvelous sight: a mighty revelation. It was a
spectacle low, horrible, immoral,” observations through which Lucy betrays her enthrallment
with the exaggerated expressivity inherent in classical tragedies and the captivating stage
presence of this actress (286). That Lucy disagrees with Dr. John’s demeaning opinion of Vashti
(“he judged her as a woman, not an artist”) further demonstrates her intrinsic sympathies for
dramatic natures (289). This scene supports the theory that Lucy possesses more performative
affinities than she is likely to admit. She is, after all, performing her introversion for the audience
of both her fellow characters and her readers. Aware of gender expectations for women to exhibit
reticence, but not too much reticence, however, Lucy repeatedly covers up these dramatic urges
through her rhetorical control and practiced demeanor of reserve.
A second action of Lucy’s that, albeit in a different manner, reveals a proclivity toward
dramatization is her earlier visit to the Catholic priest, Père Silas, for confession. Tension
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between the Catholic and Protestant religions pervade the novel in more ways than the scope of
this investigation can accommodate, but the dissonance in their attitudes towards presentation
and performance subtly mirrors the personality dichotomy of introversion v. extroversion. On
one hand, Catholic tradition prides itself on what some characterize as ostentatious display; even
confession is a performative act. Protestant customs, however, disdain Catholic showiness in
preference of less demonstrative practices. Lucy’s staunch Protestantism plays an essential role
in the construction of her introverted façade. In discussing her shared view of Lucy’s “enacted
interiority” and “prudishness as a persona,” Julia Kent confirms this notion: “Lucy’s admiration
for theatricality pervades the novel, although she works to control it by subordinating it to forms
of Protestant inwardness” (334, 335). When Lucy visits Père Silas, she not only confesses her
betrayal of her religious beliefs, but she also confesses to her readers that she is “not wholly
impervious” to the kind priest’s “softness” (Brontë 180). A shocking revelation—a Protestant
admitting softness for Catholicism?!—Lucy did not need to reveal this fallibility in her character
to her readers unless she wished to open up a new perspective on her identity. She does not let
the event speak for itself, however. Her narration quickly assures readers of the absurdity of what
she just did: “Did I, do you suppose, reader, contemplate venturing again within that worthy
priest’s reach? As soon should I have thought of walking into a Babylonish furnace” (180). This
mocking critique only thinly veils her sacrilegious moment of weakness. The emphatic reasoning
addressed to her readers for the purpose of seeking pardon for her offense carries less weight
than her physical actions, as the latter is indisputable while the former can easily be manipulated.
Villette’s conclusion brings the novel full circle in its open-ended nature that directs
attention away from the protagonist. To the end, Lucy persists in upholding her introverted
façade despite ample evidence of passionate extroversion throughout the novel. Lucy says, “Here
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pause: pause at once. There is enough said. Trouble no quiet, kind heart; leave sunny
imaginations hope. Let it be theirs to conceive the delight of joy born again fresh out of great
terror, the rapture of rescue from peril, the wondrous reprieve from dread, the fruition of return.
Let them picture union and a happy succeeding life” (546). Her subdued words hide herself, her
emotions and knowledge of the future, almost as much as she earlier hid her personal history,
leaving readers feeling somber and dissatisfied with the novel’s conclusion. Lucy (and Brontë)
has left room for a happy ending, which entails, in the minds of her readers, the “return” of M.
Paul and his “union and happy succeeding life” married to Lucy, but no reader being honest with
him or herself can ignore the fact that Brontë preferred a tragic conclusion for her hero and
heroine.5 In allowing readers to create their own endings, in “let[ting] them picture” their desired
finale, Brontë implies that a pleasing conclusion, while easier to swallow, is simply not the right
conclusion. Leaving M. Paul’s fate and her own origins unexplained ties the pair together while
distancing them from readers. In this penultimate paragraph, Lucy reverts to her suppression of
emotion as both a private coping mechanism for the implied grief of M. Paul’s drowning and as a
way of downplaying the dramatic nature of bringing any story to a close. Lucy ultimately
sacrifices the authenticity of her storytelling in favor of creating for her readers a false
impression of reticence and modesty.
Lucy’s final words cut readers off entirely from any sense of intimacy they have
previously developed. She says, “Madame Beck prospered all the days of her life; so did Père
Silas; Madame Walravens fulfilled her ninetieth year before she died. Farewell” (546). Her
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In correspondence with her publisher, George Smith, Brontë wryly writes regarding “the momentous point – M.
Paul’s fate,” that “it was designed that every reader should settle the catastrophe for himself, according to the quality
of his disposition, the tender or remorseful impulse of his nature. Drowning and Matrimony are the fearful
alternatives. The Merciful…will of course choose the former and milder doom—drown him to put him out of pain.
The cruel-hearted will on the contrary pitilessly impale him on the second horn of the dilemma—marrying him
without ruth or compunction to that—person—that—that—individual—‘Lucy Snowe’” (qtd. in Cooper’s footnote,
Brontë 603n9). Her evident sarcasm here further ironizes her ending, sardonically explicating her justification for
her desired conclusion over that which appears more desirable to her readers.
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narrational style undergoes a stark change from that of contemplative, elaborate prose to abrupt,
dry, terse sentences. The absence of emotion suggests to readers that Lucy’s life after the novel
was one of tedium and further loneliness. This passage also comes full circle to the beginning of
the novel in that its focus is outside of Lucy, this time on Madame Beck, Père Silas, and the
extremely minor character of Madame Walravens. Despite the five hundred plus pages that delve
into Lucy’s consciousness, her decision to end with an update on these three individuals
demonstrates a resistance to letting her readers believe she was in fact the center of her own
story. She situates her narrative externally as a means of distracting from the otherwise selfcenteredness of the conclusion. Readers are left with no reason to hope that Lucy will shed her
façade of introversion and embrace her extroverted proclivities, a fate that is self-protective and
socially beneficial for Lucy but a loss for readers who face the interpretive challenge of seeking
out her true qualities in the mirage of introverted disguises.
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Chapter Two
“The Proudest…Man in the World”: Failed Performance of Extroversion in Jane Austen’s
Pride and Prejudice

Villette’s highly psychological first-person narrator offers a prime opportunity to examine
authorial and readerly constructions of a single mind. In giving voice to her own narrative, Lucy
Snowe intertwines introspective reflections with keen observations of how others perceive her to
craft for her readers a calculated image of her self-identity. Readers may use Alan Palmer’s
continuing-consciousness frame to piece together Lucy’s mental events into what Palmer terms a
cognitive narrative of Lucy. In third-person narratives, however, the construction of character
identities operates rather differently. Readers are no longer invited into the depths of a single
mind but are instead exposed to multiple minds to varying degrees of closeness. Parsing
character identities in third-person narratives requires piecing together not one character’s mental
operations but rather the mental functions of multiple fictional minds. These minds perceive a
narrative’s storyworld, or “the world of the story—that ‘reality’ in which the events are
presumed to take place,” from varying aspects, each of which must be weighed appropriately in
the construction of a character’s identity (Abbott 75). Moreover, that these multiple minds often
participate in collective cognitive units of variable size and influence complicates the method by
which readers assemble individual character psychologies. Narrative theorists approach the
phenomenon of communal thought in two key ways: First, proponents of folk psychology refer to
theory of mind to describe “our awareness of the existence of other minds” and “our ability to
explain people’s behavior in terms of their thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and desires” (Palmer,
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Social Minds 20; Zunshine, “Theory of Mind” 195). Lisa Zunshine equates this concept with
“mind reading” (195). Second, narrative theorists who employ the research of cognitive
psychologists explain community thought not as the ability to predict what another mind is
thinking but instead as the working together of multiple minds in unified entities. A subset of
cognitive psychology, Palmer’s theory of social minds contends that much of cognition, in both
real life and fiction, occurs publicly as well as privately; Palmer thus divides cognition into
intramental thought that occurs independently and intermental thought that is “joint, group,
shared, or collective” (Social Minds 4). In the context of nineteenth-century novels, Brontë’s
Villette presents a single intramental mind furiously at work. On the other hand, a third-person
novel like Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice presents overlapping and intertwining intermental
networks of community cognition. This unique ability of a third-person narrator to communicate
the inner thoughts of multiple minds both individually and collectively therefore necessitates an
ancillary application of Palmer’s theory of intermental group thought atop his continuingconsciousness framework as a means of constructing character identities.
Pride and Prejudice is an ideal novel through which to investigate the cognitive
phenomenon of intermental thought in that its limited omniscient narrator wields rhetorical
capabilities extending to a collection of minds that often think in group units. With its collective
cast and emphasis on rumor and gossip, Pride and Prejudice explores the acts of reading and
misreading minds as well as the working together of communities of minds often to prejudicial
ends. From its very title, the novel draws attention to the inherent fallibility of mindreading and
cases when intermental thought, particularly society-level groupthink, runs amok: “pride” and
“prejudice” are two psychological weaknesses that frequently cause errors in interpretation and
lead to the creation of stereotypes. Austen’s novel thus explores the degrees to which characters
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succeed at reading each other’s minds, creating pleasurable possibilities for readers to engage in
reading and misreading characters’ minds as they are led and misled by the narrative’s various
cooperative intermental units. Essential to the relative success of these mental interactions,
however, is the nature of each individual character’s mind. As such, an examination of
introverted and extroverted character types illuminates the influence of nineteenth-century
standards regarding public presentation on mindreading and intermental thought processes.
Fundamentally, in keeping with one of Austen’s historically specific cultural norms, a mind that
is private and introspective is less transparent and thus perceived to be less trustworthy than an
open, public mind. Mr. Darcy and Jane Bennett are two cases in point; both characters are
misread and mistrusted as a result of their quiet natures. Darcy’s failure to conform to widely
held expectations favoring extroversion in men and Jane’s disinclination to display her emotions
diminish their functionality in society, resulting in their being intermentally condemned as
unlikeable and unmarriageable, respectively. By exploring how various pairs or groups of minds
interact, readers can better understand how this misreading occurs, why introverts are more
susceptible to misinterpretation, and how to avoid participating in injudicious intermental units.
Before conducting close analyses of Pride and Prejudice’s key scenes of misreading
introverts, it is useful to identify the essential differentiating characteristics between introverts
and extroverts that show why introverts are patently more difficult to “read” than extroverts. Carl
Jung’s twentieth-century work, Psychological Types, illuminates some of these distinguishing
features and provides a working vocabulary that can be applied to studies of minds in nineteenthcentury novels. Jung presents extroverts as being more concerned with “external objective
conditions” than with internal subjective ones; the extrovert’s “entire consciousness looks
outwards to the world,” thereby leaving his or her mind plainly legible to the public (417). On
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the other hand, introverts are “almost inaccessible to external judgment. Because they…have in
consequence a somewhat meagre capacity or willingness for expression,…[s]ince their main
activity is directed within, nothing is outwardly visible but reserve, secretiveness, lack of
sympathy, or uncertainty” (511). An introvert’s propensity for introspection or intramental
thought, coupled with his proclivity for privacy, complicates and even threatens the mindreading
process, prompting misunderstandings that may amplify into mistrust. Extroverts, on the other
hand, are typically more demonstrative in their behaviors and therefore experience less suspicion
of secrecy or apathy in their natures. Palmer and Maggie Lane confirm this “prevailing cultural
preference…in which secrecy is disliked,” both citing Emma’s title character, Persuasion’s Anne
Elliot, and Pride and Prejudice’s Elizabeth Bennett as heroines who deplore secrecy and
reservation (Palmer, Social Minds 146; Lane 35).1 Lane goes a step further to argue that Austen
herself praises “[o]penness, or open-heartedness” while regarding “reserve…with suspicion,”
but this supposition of authorial preference falls apart when the initial misreadings of introverts
in Pride and Prejudice are rectified and those reserved characters receive happy endings, as will
be discussed later (35). Austen’s personal stance aside, careful examinations of Mr. Darcy and
Jane Bennett nevertheless draw attention to nineteenth-century social biases against introverts.
To begin, I first argue that Mr. Darcy is one of literature’s classic introverts. Condemned
from the start by the Meryton townspeople (and first-time readers) for refusing to socialize with
strangers, Darcy struggles throughout the novel to display conviviality false to his genuinely shy,
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Emma Woodhouse finds Jane Fairfax “so cold, so cautious! There was no getting at her real opinion….She was
disgustingly, she was suspiciously reserved” (Austen, Emma 204). Anne Elliot observes of Mr. Elliot that he “was
rational, discreet, polished, but he was not open….This, to Anne, was a decided imperfection…She prized the frank,
the open-hearted, the eager character beyond all others” (Austen, Persuasion 18). And Elizabeth Bennett, among
others, condemns Mr. Darcy for being “haughty, reserved, and fastidious” (Austen, Pride and Prejudice 48). That
all three of these Austenian heroines express a distaste for reservation, associating shyness with having something to
hide and openness with sincerity and trustworthiness, suggests that Austen, too, may have held these biases. For
more discussion, see Chapter 3, “Openness and Reserve,” in Lane’s Understanding Austen and Chapter 5,
“Persuasion and Other Novels,” in Palmer’s Social Minds.
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reserved nature. He acknowledges this aspect of his personality when Elizabeth chides him for
not taking more dance partners at the ball in which he is introduced: Darcy says, “‘I am ill
qualified to recommend myself to strangers….I certainly have not the talent which some people
possess…of conversing easily with those I have never seen before. I cannot catch their tone of
conversation, or appear interested in their concerns, as I often see done” (Pride and Prejudice
215-6). Aware of his social ineptitude, Darcy confesses his personal incapacity for mindreading
and intrinsic aversion to participating in basic intermental cognition with strangers. Darcy
essentially proclaims himself, in unfamiliar social situations, to be mindblind,2 or “unaware of
the existence of mental things…like thoughts, beliefs, knowledge, desires, and intentions”
(Baron-Cohen 1). Of course, not all introverts are rendered mindblind in social contexts, but that
Darcy finds engaging in small talk both disagreeable and intellectually taxing indicates in his
psychology an extreme form of introversion under certain circumstances. Despite Elizabeth’s
refusal to accept Darcy’s excuse for his antisocial behavior, Darcy’s self-characterization as an
introvert invites readers to seek out confirmatory clues elsewhere in the novel.
Elizabeth and Darcy fundamentally disagree with regards to what Darcy’s admittance of
social incompetence reveals about his character. Darcy maintains that his social inhibitions are
innate and unchangeable while Elizabeth, in comparing the task of conversing to that of playing
the piano, purports that both sociability and musicality are learnable skills. She says, “‘My
fingers…do not move over this instrument in the masterly manner in which I see so many
women’s do….But then I have always supposed it to be my own fault—because I would not take
the trouble of practicing. It is not that I do not believe my fingers as capable as any other
woman’s of superior execution’” (216). Elizabeth hints that Darcy’s social awkwardness is a
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This term is often used to describe autistic individuals, and while I would never go so far as to diagnose Mr. Darcy
with autism, I do believe that he is confessing to experiencing similar symptoms when in the company of individuals
with whom he is not previously acquainted.
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weakness, that sociability must be practiced and honed, especially for men. By comparing the
skill of affability to a skill women in particular were expected to master regardless of their
personal taste for music, Elizabeth also hints that Darcy’s weakness is enabled by his privilege as
a man. She ultimately suggests that failing to overcome shyness is shirking a social obligation. In
her mind, Darcy has chosen not to overcome his timidity and therefore must be proud. Elizabeth
characteristically uses reason to justify her participation in the group thought of her time and
place. She prides herself on being an independent thinker regardless of how others will perceive
her (how dare she walk through mud to visit her ill sister rather than wait for a carriage!), yet she
more often than not propagates the stereotypical prejudices held by her community. Suggesting
that Darcy ought to defeat his shyness both confirms the town’s general disapprobation of his
behavior and corroborates the nineteenth-century preference for extroversion in men.
This ‘general disapprobation’ of Darcy’s behavior signifies the novel’s predominant
large intermental unit,3 which substantially influences how individual characters think about and
perceive their surroundings. Austen begins constructing this large intermental unit in the novel’s
famous first line, “It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a
good fortune, must be in want of a wife” (29). That any single “truth” may be “universally
acknowledged” implies the existence of a large intermental unit, here including all of English
society, thinking collectively. Austen further develops the mind of this large intermental unit
during the ball scene in which Mr. Darcy and Mr. Bingley are first introduced. Darcy is initially
distinguished from the others of his party: though Mr. Bingley was “good looking and
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Palmer puts forth a typological framework that distinguishes five levels of intermental thought: 1. Intermental
encounters at the level of the conversation, requiring minimal mindreading abilities; 2. Small intermental units at the
level of intimate pairs or small groups that engage in seamless mindreading and cooperative thought, ex. a marriage;
3. Medium-sized intermental units, ex. colleagues or a neighborhood; 4. Large intermental units at the level of a
community that has a collective opinion or consensus view on a particular topic (as depicted in the townspeople of
Meryton); and 5. Intermental minds of any number of individuals that operate as a unit so successfully that they are
considered one mind. For a more detailed explanation of Palmer’s typology, see Social Minds, Chapter 2.
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gentlemanlike,” Mr. Bingley’s sisters “fine women,” and Mr. Bingley’s brother-in-law
“merely…the gentleman,” Mr. Darcy
soon drew the attention of the room by his fine, tall person, handsome features,
noble mien; and the report which was in general circulation within five minutes
after his entrance, of his having ten thousand a year. The gentlemen pronounced
him to be a fine figure of a man, the ladies declared he was much handsomer than
Mr. Bingley, and he was looked at with great admiration for about half the
evening. (39)
At this point in a first read of the novel, readers, too, adopt this perception of Darcy as a grand
personage, impressive to the fellows and desirable to the ladies, for they have no other evidence
upon which to form an independent opinion. Austen purposefully withholds Darcy’s true nature
until later in the novel in order to cast her readers as participants in the town’s large intermental
unit, or what Patricia Meyer Spacks describes as a “local ‘universe,’” one that “relies heavily on
rumor” (39n10). Austen tricks her readers into forming the same first impressions based on the
same biases held by characters in the novel. Furthermore, in taking advantage of the traditional
ball setting to poke fun at small-town dynamics, Austen exposes the shallow, assumptive nature
of Meryton’s group character, a liability readers should be wary of becoming culpable to.
Darcy’s glowing first impression lasts only “for about half the evening” and is summarily
refuted when his “manners gave a disgust which turned the tide of his popularity; for he was
discovered to be proud, to be above his company, and above being pleased” (39). In the course of
a single sentence, the community’s intermental bias shifts from a positive to a negative view of
Darcy, but for what reasons? First, his presentation differs notably from that of Mr. Bingley,
whom all agree comports himself like a true gentleman. While Bingley swiftly and easily “made
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himself acquainted with all the principal people in the room,” “was lively and unreserved,” and
“danced every dance,” thereby gaining the endorsement of all present, Mr. Darcy “danced only
once with Mrs. Hurst and once with Miss Bingley, declined being introduced to any other lady,
and spent the rest of the evening in walking about the room, speaking occasionally to one of his
own party” (39-40). The women at the ball interpret Darcy’s rigidity as failing to fulfill his
gentlemanly duty of sociability. Darcy is thus unanimously condemned: “His character was
decided. He was the proudest most disagreeable man in the world, and every body hoped that he
would never come there again” (40). The use of passive voice—his character was decided—in
this statement leaves the action of the sentence in the hands of no one in particular and therefore
everyone all together. This syntactical decision unites readers and the Meryton townspeople into
one all-encompassing intermental unit and suggests that the narrator, too, corroborates the
change in evaluation. The overwhelming rhetorical consensus prompts first-time readers to arrive
at the same conclusion that Darcy is a haughty, uncivil snob.
This first impression of Darcy’s character fails to do justice to his authentic disposition.
First-time readers are initially as blind to Darcy’s introversion as are the residents of Meryton,
but there are earlier instances than the one already quoted in which Darcy professes introverted
aspects of his personality that excuse some, not all, of his misunderstood behaviors. The first
instance occurs in Darcy’s response to Mr. Bingley’s urging him to dance: Darcy asserts, “‘I
certainly shall not. You know how I detest it, unless I am particularly acquainted with my
partner….Your sisters are engaged, and there is not another woman in the room, whom it would
not be a punishment to me to stand up with” (40). Darcy blatantly insults every woman at the
ball he does not know, but I argue that his contempt derives from an intense discomfort with the
social environment. Darcy’s ensuing comment describing Elizabeth as “tolerable; but not
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handsome enough to tempt me” is less defensible, particularly because the comment was made
with Elizabeth in earshot (41). Spacks proposes that this provocation is an early form of flirtation
from Darcy to Elizabeth, but in order for Elizabeth to be able to perceive it as such, the two
would need to be operating as a far more intimate intermental pair than is conceivable at this
stage of their acquaintance (41n26). Darcy is likely not even aware of flirtatious intentions.
Elizabeth is therefore unable to read in Darcy’s ensuing statement—that he is “in no humour at
present to give consequence to young ladies who are slighted by other men”—admittance of his
shy nature (41-2). Darcy’s use of the term “humour,” in reference not to his general temperament
but to his present mood, suggests to readers that the circumstances rather than Darcy’s nature
disposed him towards his criticism of Elizabeth’s “tolerability.” Darcy’s arrogance in this scene
serves as a defense mechanism against his social discomfiture, but that Elizabeth misconstrues
(albeit understandably) his statements as indicative of a flaw in his character illustrates a subtle
failure of mindreading that is not righted until much later in the novel.
Elizabeth appears to have gained a better understanding of Darcy’s psychology and the
two engage in more effective intermental cognition at a later party in which Darcy tries to amend
for his earlier snub by inviting Elizabeth to dance. Elizabeth takes advantage of this opportunity
to instruct (or, to further Spacks’ supposition, flirt with) Darcy about the rules for proper
communication with a dance partner. After a period of silence, Elizabeth “suddenly fanc[ies] that
it would be the greater punishment to her partner to oblige him to talk” (131). In recognizing that
“oblig[ing]” Darcy to talk would pain and discomfit him, Elizabeth demonstrates a new
awareness of (though not sympathy for) Darcy’s introverted qualities. Elizabeth teases him by
making “some slight observation on the dance,” to which Darcy “replied, and was again silent”
(131). Elizabeth urges him, “It is your turn to say something now, Mr. Darcy.—I talked about the
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dance, and you ought to make some sort of remark on the size of the room, or the number of
couples” (131). Purposing to make him uncomfortable, Elizabeth continues to mock Darcy’s lack
of social skills by ironically comparing him to herself: “I have always seen a great similarity in
the turn of our minds.—We are each of an unsocial, taciturn disposition, unwilling to speak,
unless we expect to say something that will amaze the whole room” (131). Elizabeth intends for
Darcy to see through her expert sarcasm; she wants him to think alongside her and recognize that
the “similarity” between their minds she describes in fact highlights the key difference between
Darcy’s introversion and her own frank nature. Elizabeth invites Darcy to read her mind as a way
of testing his own self-awareness. Darcy succeeds in parsing her true meaning and gives voice to
an interpretation of Elizabeth’s remark that indicates some amenability that is belied by the
intermental judgment held against him: “‘This is no very striking resemblance of your own
character…How near it may be to mine, I cannot pretend to say.—You think it a faithful portrait
undoubtedly’” (131). This exchange demonstrates the gradual breaking down of boundaries that
permits the two characters to move one step closer to seamless intermental cognition.
In examining Darcy’s identity, it is important to remember that the intermental unit of the
town, including Elizabeth, is not the only unit with which Darcy interacts. Because his social
context so considerably alters his behavior, readers piecing together Darcy’s cognitive narrative
must acknowledge not only how Elizabeth and the townspeople initially judge him but also how
Darcy is perceived by others in the novel with whom he is better acquainted. Palmer’s concept of
situated identity, which confirms that “identity is distributed among the minds of others,” aids
readers in piecing Darcy’s different personas into a cohesive understanding of his whole
character (Fictional Minds 168). Only after combining Darcy’s embedded narrative, “the whole
of [his] various perceptual and conceptual viewpoints,” which readers are limited in their
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exposure to, with all of the novel’s doubly embedded narratives, or aspectual understandings of
his mind “as contained within another character’s mind,” are readers able to grasp his ‘true
nature’ (Fictional Minds 15, 231). When he is first judged in the context of the ball, the Meryton
townspeople construct a doubly embedded narrative of Darcy as an arrogant, self-important man.
This is but one of Darcy’s several doubly embedded narratives within the novel. For instance,
Mr. Bingley, who knows him well, never questions Darcy’s fundamental character and follows
his advice without hesitation. Wickham, on the other hand, manipulatively paints a dark, almost
criminal picture of Darcy because of their dubious history. These coexisting opposite readings of
the same character validate the importance of not merely accepting one aspect as the truth.
Readers must be willing to adjust their interpretations of Darcy’s character as they are exposed to
different perceptions of him in order to avoid falling into the same prejudicial trap as Elizabeth.
Readers must be aware of others’ readings of Darcy in part because the novel offers few
opportunities to see directly into his psychology, or his self-aspect. The third-person narration of
Pride and Prejudice restricts readers’ access to Darcy’s mind to his dialogue (which is inevitably
shaped by his social context) and his letter writing. One of these rare opportunities for readers to
enter Darcy’s inner self-evaluations occurs in his centrally located letter to Elizabeth following
his rejected marriage proposal. However, it is then Elizabeth’s process of reading and rereading
the letter that uncovers the interpretive significance of being invited into Darcy’s mind. When
Elizabeth first sits to read the letter, “with a strong prejudice against every thing [Darcy] might
say,” she desires “to discredit it entirely” (245, 246). She predisposes herself to disbelieve all of
the letter’s contents. However, Darcy’s reports of his relationship with Wickham and his
warnings to Mr. Bingley regarding Jane unsettle her, and she re-peruses the epistle “with the
closest attention” (246). Darcy’s honest self-account of his behaviors and actions has a profound
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impact on Elizabeth’s (and readers’) perception of his character. That this self-account comes in
the form of a letter in a way lends credence to its genuineness; Darcy’s shyness renders him poor
at representing himself in face-to-face confrontations and so expressing himself through writing
enables him to “present” himself with composure. Through Elizabeth’s rereading, she at last
recognizes the multifariousness of interpretation and the subjective influence of “countenance,
voice, and manner” on the formation of first impressions (247). The letter removes these three
elements from the equation and facilitates a more objective evaluation of Darcy’s words alone.
From this point on, Elizabeth and readers become more trusting of Darcy as a character and more
eager to comprehend his mysterious cognitive narrative.
Elizabeth’s experience while reading and rereading this letter has the added impact of
inducing her to revise her reading of herself. Spacks points out that the “situation of being forced
to alter previously held views is unusual for [Elizabeth]: she tends to state her opinions
forthrightly and to believe in them absolutely” (247n10). Relinquishing a prior conviction is a
key event in Elizabeth’s character arc that enables her to critique her own flaws and prejudices as
she examines others’. In reevaluating Darcy, she also reconsiders her opinion of Wickham,
whom she now realizes she has tactlessly misread, though for markedly different reasons than
those for which she misread Darcy. She sees that she based her favorable opinion of the soldier
on his physical attractiveness, “the general approbation of the neighborhood, and the regard
which his social powers had gained him” (247). The intermental unit of the neighborhood and
Wickham’s superior social skills skewed Elizabeth’s initial appraisal of him. Wickham’s
extroverted personality painted a picture in her mind as “her model of the amiable and pleasing,”
while Darcy’s introverted personality prevented her from seeing past his serene, austere
presentation (192). After reading Darcy’s letter, Elizabeth finally grows aware that she is not

	
  

43	
  

	
  

impervious to the pressures of community thought, no matter how independent she may be or
how much she purports to rely on reason. She, too, falls prey to forming false judgments based
on nineteenth-century standards regarding introversion and extroversion. The effect of her close
rereading of Darcy’s letter and, as a result, his character is, ironically, an in depth rereading of
herself: “‘Till this moment, I never knew myself,’” she says (249). Herein lies the introspective
payoff of reading and rereading. Felicia Bonaparte points out that Elizabeth’s arriving at the skill
of being able to read “the world as well as the word” constitutes the novel’s “bildung” in
developing Elizabeth’s “philosophic” powers of “practical empiricism” (261, 265). Elizabeth’s
ability to discern Darcy’s honesty from her preexisting biases facilitates her psychological
growth just as readers’ abilities to reread Darcy enable them to achieve a more sophisticated
understanding of his role in the novel as an introvert misunderstood by a flawed society.
Elizabeth’s rereading of Darcy’s letter does not yet fully convince her of Darcy’s purity
of mind. Darcy’s character continues to be situated differently in the minds of different
characters, thereby provoking the same contentious question presented in the exploration of Lucy
Snowe: how do readers determine which reading is the “right” reading of Darcy as he exists
within the novel’s storyworld? Austen’s focalization through Elizabeth’s psychology encourages
readers to follow her incrementally changing views of Mr. Darcy, but the wary reader should
recognize that Elizabeth’s judgment is not always sound. In order to arrive at an answer to the
above question, I again suggest that readers must acutely examine the aspect that is closest to the
character in question (in familiarity, mutual trust, and/or physicality) or the aspect in which the
character is most at ease to “be himself,” if you will. In addition to the self-aspect represented in
his letter, the closest perspective from which to evaluate Darcy’s character is from his home in
Derbyshire. During a visit to the Pemberley estate with the Gardiners, Elizabeth is surprised
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when Darcy’s housekeeper asserts, “He is the best landlord, and the best master…that ever
lived….Some people call him proud; but I am sure I never saw any thing of it. To my fancy, it is
only because he does not rattle away like other young men” (289). Initially bent on disbelieving
the housekeeper, Elizabeth gradually realizes that her recommendation of Mr. Darcy “was of no
trifling nature. What praise is more valuable than the praise of an intelligent servant?” (290).
To Elizabeth’s further surprise, Darcy himself arrives just as she is preparing to leave. In
Darcy’s conduct Elizabeth observes an “[a]maz[ing]…alteration of his manner” since their last
encounter in which Darcy, “with a look of haughty composure,” handed her the above discussed
letter (292, 235). She observes that he is not in “perfect composure” but is “of perfect civility”
(292). Spacks notes, “the words civil and civility occur eleven times in this chapter, always with
reference to Darcy….Here this language has no connotation of empty forms; it describes a
profound change in Darcy’s manners” (292n37). This emphasis on Darcy’s seemingly newfound
civility within the context of his home highlights the role of circumstance, time, and place in
determining Darcy’s behavior. Mr. and Mrs. Gardiner’s first impressions of Mr. Darcy differ
tremendously from those which Darcy’s demeanor prompted in Meryton. Mr. Gardiner says,
“‘He is perfectly well behaved, polite, and unassuming,’” and Mrs. Gardiner admits, “‘There is
something a little stately in him to be sure…but it is confined to his air, and is not unbecoming. I
can now say with the housekeeper, that though some people may call him proud, I have seen
nothing of it” (299). These drastically different first impressions are accounted for by the change
in setting in which Darcy is introduced to his new acquaintances. In the unfamiliar context of the
country ball, Darcy’s social discomfort induced him to present an inaccurate persona, but in the
familiar aspect of his home, he is at ease to present a truer picture of the gentleman he really is.
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Mr. Darcy is not without his faults, however. His inability to read the minds of strangers
extends to Miss Jane Bennett, whose emotions Darcy grossly miscalculates as a result of her
introverted disposition. Jane’s introversion differs from Darcy’s, though. Rather than being
discomfited in and averse to social situations, Jane is simply quiet, reserved, and polite, overall
possessive of the qualities expected of a young woman in the nineteenth century. Yet, these
generally desirable features diminish her in Mr. Darcy’s mind as a suitable match for Mr.
Bingley. In his letter to Elizabeth, Darcy describes the effect of an “evening’s scrutiny” of Jane:
“Her look and manners were open, cheerful, and engaging as ever, but without any symptom of
peculiar regard…the serenity of your sister’s countenance and air was such, as might have given
the most acute observer, a conviction that, however amiable her temper, her heart was not likely
to be easily touched” (238). Darcy paints the picture of a model woman who succeeds in
balancing conviviality with reticence, engages in conversation without excessive emotional
display, and conceals her romantic attractions. Jane very properly obeys the common instruction
of conduct books to never “let your eager attention and visible preference betray the flutter of
your heart” when talking with a gentleman, yet Darcy misconstrues her propriety for impartiality
(Gregory 34). Darcy’s mistake in interpretation (like Elizabeth’s misreading) demonstrates the
severe limitation of relying on visual cues alone in the attempt of reading another’s mind. This
second occurrence of misidentifying an introvert’s thoughts and motivations again illustrates the
challenge of reading minds whose mental operations incline inwards and also the inescapability
of nineteenth-century preferences for extroversion, even in the mind of an introvert.
Despite these central misreadings of fictional minds in the novel, Darcy and Jane in the
end marry their beloveds and enter into the intimate spousal relationships that constitute the
strongest intermental pairs. A happy marriage is one in which both partners think as one, perhaps
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not always agreeing, but nevertheless able to read the other’s mind without the verbal aid of
conversation; Austen leaves no room to doubt the happiness of Darcy’s and Jane’s marriages.
When Elizabeth asks Darcy what originally sparked his attraction to her, Darcy plainly states,
“‘For the liveliness of your mind’” (Pride and Prejudice 422). Elizabeth’s mind, not her beauty
or actions, captivated Darcy; his desire to communicate with her intermentally, to understand and
interact with her internal cognition, made him seek her companionship. To the hopelessly
romantic reader (a decent portion of Austen’s audience, I would imagine), this establishes the
foundation of a truly equal, united partnership. Elizabeth, characteristically candid, says,
You may as well call it impertinence at once.…The fact is, that you were sick of
civility, of deference, of officious attention. You were disgusted with the women
who were always speaking, and looking, and thinking for your approbation alone.
I roused, and interested you, because I was so unlike them. Had you not been
really amiable, you would have hated me for it; but in spite of the pains you took
to disguise yourself, your feelings were always noble and just; and in your heart,
you thoroughly despised the persons who so assiduously courted you. There—I
have saved you the trouble of accounting for it; and really, all things considered, I
begin to think it perfectly reasonable. To be sure, you knew no actual good of
me—but nobody thinks of that when they fall in love. (422)
Elizabeth retroactively comprehends Darcy’s mind, verbally expressing what she intuits are (and
were) his thoughts and feelings. Readers do not witness as much of Jane and Mr. Bingley’s
intermental cognition, but it is clear that the couple’s happiness rests on their thinking differently
together than they might individually: the newlyweds “remained at Netherfield only a
twelvemonth. So near a vicinity to [Jane’s] mother and Meryton relations was not desirable even
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to his easy temper, or her affectionate heart” (427). Alone, it is less likely that either partner
would have been inclined to move away from Meryton, but now that their minds are one, Jane’s
“affectionate heart” and Mr. Bingley’s “easy temper” privilege a different mode of thought.
Austen ties together these marriage plots not only to give readers their desired happy ending but
also to demonstrate the powerful nature of intermental cognition between happy couples.
These classically happy endings granted to Mr. Darcy and Jane also betray, in my mind,
Austen’s compassion for those characters who are misread as a result of their introverted natures.
This reading of her classic text is not intended to suggest that Austen favors introverts over
extroverts; rather, it shows Austen vying through her writing for the rectification of
misinterpretations that occur on the bases of pride and various societal prejudices. That introverts
are more frequently misread for reasons outside of their control is simply a coincidence. I
maintain that Austen sympathizes with those who are inadvertently misread and scorns those
who purposefully mislead. Darcy and Jane both receive their desired marital conclusions while
Wickham is forced into a matrimonial situation he had hoped to evade. Furthermore, this novel
about mindreading and intermental cognition aptly illustrates the fallibility of first impressions
and the importance of being willing to revise those impressions. In bringing Mr. Darcy, Jane, and
Wickham to justice, and in enabling characters and readers to rectify their mistaken judgments,
Austen displays her commitments to truth, open-mindedness, and trust. Pride and Prejudice thus
privileges the careful working together of different kinds of minds through reason and
understanding to achieve meaningful relationships more so than it stands to perpetuate societal
values regarding performance and reticence.
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Coda
Resigned to Introversion: Philip Wakem in George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss

Lucy Snowe of Villette and Mr. Darcy and Jane Bennett of Pride and Prejudice fit neatly
into this discussion of how characters perform or fail to perform nineteenth-century expectations
regarding introversion and extroversion, performance and reticence. In the above investigations
of how these three characters behave in private compared with their public interactions, I have
relied on elements of cognitive narrative theory to demonstrate the ways in which a character’s
willingness to comply with standards of propriety and sociability impacts the reading of his or
her mind by fellow characters and readers. First, Lucy Snowe presents an example of a woman
who carefully manipulates her public persona so as to participate normatively and selfprotectively in her social environment. I have argued that Lucy is inherently an extrovert, driven
by an intense need for social approbation and torn by a suppressed proclivity for dramatization.
She disguises these innate characteristics, however, under a façade of introversion. I maintain
that Lucy exploits her authority as a first-person narrator to construct this introverted façade for
her fictional peers and her readers both as a coping mechanism for her fears of intimacy and loss
and as a way of conforming to nineteenth-century British ideals for women. Furthermore, I
contend that Lucy the character is significantly more passive and voyeuristic than Lucy the
narrator, who actively engineers her rhetoric to deceive, a discrepancy that points to Lucy’s
endeavors to conceal extroverted elements of her personality and to muffle passionate desires
that conflict with her constructed image of operating through reason and control. In addition to
sifting through Lucy’s rhetorical maneuvers, readers must also interpret how other characters
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read Lucy’s façade and then determine which aspects of her situated identity are most
trustworthy. In combining these elements of Lucy’s narrative, readers quickly find that the
cognitive narrative they construct for her in many ways conflicts with the narrative she tells. A
reader attuned to Lucy’s personal and social motives, however, is able to recognize that her
conscious efforts to present as an introvert ultimately strive to disguise her extroverted nature.
Unlike Villette, Pride and Prejudice employs a third-person narrator, which removes the
element of embodied rhetorical performance from the equation. The characters in Austen’s novel
I have explored are two born introverts who fail to perform nineteenth-century standards of
decorum: Mr. Darcy and Jane Bennett neglect to exhibit the sociability and openness expected of
them and, as a result, are misinterpreted in ways that threaten their abilities to function in society.
Because of his discomfort in large social events and his aversion to conversing (much less,
dancing) with strangers, Mr. Darcy makes a poor first impression on the community of Meryton.
He is read as proud and egotistical, thus obstructing Elizabeth’s ability to perceive him as a
potential mate even once he has actively pursued her. Jane, too, is misread on the basis of her
introversion, ironically so by Darcy himself. Rather than sympathizing with Jane’s reticence or
recognizing that women of the time were expected to refrain from overt admissions of romantic
desire, Darcy reads Jane’s reserve as not reciprocating Mr. Bingley’s attraction. Readers later
learn that Darcy’s primary flaw is not pride (though he is proud) but rather social awkwardness
and that Jane is merely reserved. Nevertheless, both characters’ dispositions initially hinder their
abilities to participate in their respective marriage plots. Jane and Darcy do ultimately enjoy the
traditional endings of an Austen novel, demonstrating Austen’s covert sympathies for misread
introverts amidst the underlying social prejudice against them as a result of their minds being
less transparent and more challenging to read than extroverts’.
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What ultimately enables Lucy Snowe to maintain her introverted façade and Mr. Darcy
and Jane Bennett to have their happy endings is that each character seemingly has control over
his or her outward presentation; despite various innate proclivities and intrinsic personality traits,
Lucy, Darcy, and Jane are all able to overcome their natural propensities and function in their
strictly regulated societies. They each succeed in tempering their extreme characteristics to suit
the expected moderation between introversion and extroversion. This ability to control one’s
self-presentation, however, is a gift often taken for granted. That the characters thus far discussed
have the privilege of molding their images problematizes the reading of characters whose outside
circumstances limit their abilities to erect a public façade or display nuanced personality traits.
Lucy, Darcy, and Jane are all able to present their native dispositions, though one chooses to
disguise herself while the others simply need closer acquaintance to be understood. So, how
should a reader interpret a character whose innate personality is not allowed to flourish but is
rather restricted by external factors? To what extent can a reader (or fellow characters) judge the
actions and behaviors of characters whose circumstances force them to adapt to potentially
undesired lifestyles and prevent them from developing the relationships that might enable them
to alter those circumstances? And how should readers negotiate their sympathies for characters
that don’t have that underestimated agency to manipulate how others perceive them? While Lucy
Snowe, Mr. Darcy, and Jane Bennett adeptly illustrate the powers of performance in social
engagement, Philip Wakem of George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss (1860) is instead denied
performative agency and therefore offers a rich opportunity for cognitive analysis of nineteenthcentury novelistic depictions of introversion and extroversion. Examining how Philip’s identity
is situated within the various mental aspects of his community, how large and small intermental
units operate within the novel in ways that influence readerly impressions of Philip, and how
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Philip’s body language communicates his mental actions will enable readers, through Alan
Palmer’s continuing-consciousness frame, to illuminate much about Philip’s cognitive narrative.
Perhaps even more emotionally troubled than the rebellious Maggie, Philip Wakem is
from the beginning set apart from society as a result of his physical disfigurement. Introduced as
“the deformed lad” one hundred pages before he is named, Philip is subliminally objectified in
readers’ minds long before they are given the opportunity to judge him for his character (78). Mr.
and Mrs. Tulliver are discussing with various aunts and uncles the issue of sending Tom to
apprentice under a clergyman because the wealthy Mr. Wakem is doing so with his son. “‘But
Lawyer Wakem’s son’s got a hump-back,’” Mrs. Pullet objects; “‘it’s more nat’ral to send him to
a clergyman’” (78). Mr. Glegg agrees; Philip’s disability makes him unfit for the business world.
Similarly to how Mr. Darcy is initially judged against Mr. Bingley in Pride and Prejudice, Philip
is placed in direct opposition to his more socially normative counterpart, Tom. Tom is viewed as
the ideal young man just as Mr. Bingley represents the model gentleman, while Philip is the
pitiable cripple and Mr. Darcy an arrogant snob. Readers witness a large intermental unit1 at
work against Philip, but it is important to note that this prejudice operates far differently from
that which operates on Mr. Darcy. Darcy is judged on the basis of his behavior, while Philip is
judged because of his physicality. The former can be manipulated; the latter is permanent. Herein
lies a challenge of interpreting Philip alongside characters like Mr. Darcy, Jane Bennett, and
Lucy Snowe: even this early scene in which Philip is absent shows readers Philip’s limited
agency in determining his own destiny—it is only “nat’ral” for him to study with a clergyman.
Thus, the disproportionate weight of external factors acting on Philip’s psychology places an
additional burden on the reader who is attempting to piece together his cognitive narrative.
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See Chapter Two for explanation of large intermental units.
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Brief though the above exchange is, it nevertheless merits further consideration with
regard to how it situates Philip on the introversion – extroversion scale. The dialogue about
Tom’s future as it relates to Philip’s delineates clear dichotomies between the physically fit and
physically deformed, businessman and clergyman, and, in turn, extrovert and introvert. I suggest
that each of these dichotomies is interwoven with the others: broadly speaking, the physically fit
are better equipped to be successful in business by virtue of being more socially active and thus
appealing to prospective clients, while (as insinuated by Mr. Glegg) the physically deformed are
better suited for the clergy in that its quiet, bookish lifestyle opposes gregariousness and suits the
introverted personality type. In this sense, it appears that the collective mind of the town has
relegated Philip, on account of his hunched back, to the life of a clergyman and an introvert.
Whether Philip corroborates this “choice” of occupation is yet to be determined. At this stage of
a first read of the novel, readers have no reason to assume that this unnamed son will play a
significant role in Maggie’s central narrative and, as such, need not question the ethics of the
town’s opinion. Not until readers grow more invested in Philip’s outcome do they begin to
challenge the overarching view that Philip’s physical limitations consequently limit him
intellectually, socially, and emotionally, as well.
When readers actually meet Philip, the reputed image of a disabled hermit is at first
confirmed. “The deformed lad” is finally given a name when he is presented as Tom’s new
schoolfellow. Tom’s reaction is predictable given his participation in the intermental unit of his
community: “Tom felt in an uncomfortable flutter as he took off his woollen comforter and other
wrappings. He had seen Philip Wakem at St. Ogg’s, but had always turned his eyes away from
him as quickly as possible. He would have disliked having a deformed boy for his companion,
even if Philip had not been the son of a bad man” (181). The Tulliver family has economic
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reasons to be at odds with the Wakems, but the details of Tom’s physical discomfort (being in a
“flutter”) and his aversion to looking at Philip place more emphasis on Philip’s physicality than
on the discord with his father. Philip is aware of Tom’s embarrassment and anxiety, for
“everyone, almost, disliked looking at him, and his deformity was more conspicuous when he
walked” (182). The picture of Philip as a grotesque figure is challenged, though, when Tom
observes that his face “was really not a disagreeable face” (182). In addition to noticing a gentle
maturity in Philip’s look, Tom finds himself admiring Philip’s “enviable manner” of holding his
pencil as he draws, an observation that defies Philip’s otherwise physical inelegance (183). This
humanizing quality both impresses Tom and arouses sympathy for Philip that cues readers to
question their own participation in the large intermental unit of the town. The consequence of
this seeming opposition in Philip’s character (being at once awkward and graceful) triggers
readers to enter Palmer’s continuing-consciousness frame2 in which they begin to piece clues
together to construct a fuller understanding of Philip’s cognitive narrative.
That The Mill on the Floss is written in the third person, like Pride and Prejudice, and
that it primarily focalizes through Maggie both limit the depth with which readers can access
Philip’s consciousness. As such, readers have two main avenues for constructing Philip’s
cognitive narrative: first, much of what readers learn about Philip’s thoughts and his perspective
on the world comes from dialogue with others, most often Maggie. As Maggie grows to be his
one close confidante, Philip openly shares his literary interests, life philosophies, and romantic
feelings. Secondly, readers augment their understandings of Philip’s consciousness through close
readings of his body language. Philip’s physicality is central to his character, as is evidenced by
the consistent objectification of his deformity in defining his identity. Lisa Zunshine uses the
term embodied transparency to describe “the moments in fictional narratives when characters’
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body language involuntarily betrays their feelings, particularly if they want to conceal them from
others” (23). She then identifies three “rules” for embodied transparency in prose fiction:
contrast, between a character’s transparencies at two points in time or between two different
characters’ relative transparencies; transience, the brevity of the transparency; and restraint, the
character’s efforts to conceal feelings and mask body language (see 30). To illustrate, when
Philip is depicted as being adroit with a pencil, his body language is contrasted with Tom’s (and
readers’) expectations of his physicality. The moment is transient in that the chapter ends with
Tom’s determination to reassert his superiority by alluding to Philip’s “unfitness for active
sports” in his suggestion that Philip “‘could fish…It’s only standing and sitting still, you know’”
(186-7). And, Philip’s “winc[ing]” reaction and “almost peevish” response demonstrate restraint
in not wanting to betray to Tom his hurt feelings (187). Conducting this kind of close analysis of
Philip’s body language and dialogue throughout the novel would facilitate the construction of a
continuing-consciousness frame for Philip, particularly in cases where his reclusive behaviors,
hunched posture, and introspective speeches highlight introverted characteristics.
One exemplary area in which Philip’s body language particularly hurts him is in the way
his disfigurement limits his ability to participate in stereotypically male activities. Frequent
feminization of Philip’s character further separates him from society. Upon first meeting Philip,
Tom silently pities how “the brown hair round [his face] waved and curled at the ends like a
girl’s,” and he later hurtfully yells, “‘You know I won’t hit you because you’re no better than a
girl’” (182, 196). When Maggie, caught up in the moment, expresses to Philip that she “‘should
like never to part’” and wants “‘to make [his] life very happy,’” she then “stoop[s] to kiss the
pale face that was full of pleading, timid love—like a woman’s” (382). Philip himself
acknowledges, “‘there are many other things I long for…things that other men have and that will
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always be denied me’” (342). Such emasculation both removes Philip from heteronormative
relations and resigns him to the private sphere of the home. That he is viewed as inferior to other
men affects Philip emotionally. Instilled with resentment, Philip resorts to solitary, introverted
hobbies that cultivate his intellect rather than his sociability. The narrator defends Philip’s
effeminate nature, however, asking of readers, “Do not think too hardly of Philip….Kept aloof
from all practical life as Philip had been, and by nature half feminine in sensitiveness, he had
some of the woman’s intolerant repulsion toward worldliness and the deliberate pursuit of
sensual enjoyment” (375). In other words, Philip’s femininity is not his own fault; his upbringing
and disability forced him to remain isolated in the home, where he adopted an introspective life
of domestic pastimes. The androgyny within Philip’s identity both compromises his capacity for
romance and highlights the analogous ambiguity between introversion and extroversion. Philip’s
inability to meet expectations for males physically, socially, and emotionally ultimately centers
on his parallel inability to perform extroverted behaviors.
At this point, it would perhaps be overly forgiving to suggest that Philip’s separation
from society and resignation into introversion are entirely out of his control. It is conceivable that
Philip’s deformity, among other factors, initiated his seclusion, but the resultant feelings of
isolation likely then triggered behaviors of resentment that perpetuated his solitude. Barbara
Guth articulates the blend of external and internal elements acting on Philip’s isolation:
If Maggie finds little comfort and support in the society around her, Philip finds
less. His father’s relative wealth, frequently gained at the expense of his
neighbors, cuts him off from many possible companions. In addition to his
deformity, his interests in music, art, and literature separate Philip from people
such as Tom who value only practical achievements. Philip’s wide exposure to
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culture brings him close to contempt for the people around him. His selfconsciousness makes him see slights where none is intended and avoid contact
that might be embarrassing to himself or others. His “half feminine”…sensitivity
makes him withdraw from the fellowship and friendship that he desires. Philip’s
protest takes the form of seclusion. (359)
Guth presents only two reasons for Philip’s isolation that are out of his control: his father’s
wealth and his deformity. Otherwise, she seems to believe that much of Philip’s tragic story falls
in his own hands, that his choice of interests and emotional reactions contribute to his “protest,”
a term that grants Philip significant agency over his isolation. I question these claims. Guth
suggests that Philip does not “value…practical achievements” as Tom does, but isn’t it more
likely that Philip’s disability from a young age prevented him from being physically able to
pursue standard “male” interests? If so, did his perceived inability to fulfill male expectations
from his youth oblige him to seek out alternative amusements? His insecurities spring from being
repeatedly and openly repelled by others, not from choice, so should readers interpret his selfseclusion as a protest, or does his reclusiveness function instead as a defense mechanism?
Parsing the circumstantial from the dispositional elements of Philip’s personality enables readers
to separate their understandings of the life Philip leads from who Philip is as a character, two
facets of this misunderstood boy’s narrative that often conflict with one another.
Maggie is the one character from whom readers are truly able to garner a sense of who
Philip is. Not only does she elicit Philip’s feelings and philosophies through their conversations
in the Red Deeps, but also readers learn about Philip by appreciating the essence of what makes
their relationship special. In the scene in which Maggie first interacts with Philip, she is unafraid
to look at his disfigurement. Instead,
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she could not help looking with growing interest at the new schoolfellow,
although he was the son of that wicked Lawyer Wakem who made her father so
angry….Tom some weeks ago had sent her word that Philip knew no end of
stories—not stupid stories like hers, and she was convinced now from her own
observation that he must be very clever; she hoped he would think her rather
clever too when she came to talk to him. Maggie, moreover, had rather a
tenderness for deformed things; she preferred the wry-necked lambs because it
seemed to her that the lambs which were quite strong and well made wouldn’t
mind so much about being petted, and she was especially fond of petting objects
that would think it very delightful to be petted by her. (201)
Imbued with Maggie’s persistent need to be loved and appreciated, this passage displays a
tenderness and curiosity towards Philip unique from the typical reaction others have upon seeing
him. I believe Maggie sees something of a kindred spirit in Philip, who is denied love on the
basis of simply being what—not who—he is. Maggie says to Tom, “‘I think Philip Wakem
seems a nice boy….He couldn’t choose his father, you know,’” demonstrating her awareness that
Philip’s reputation is founded on factors outside his control (201). Philip senses Maggie’s
curiosity when he catches her “pair of questioning dark eyes fixed upon him,” but he is not made
uncomfortable by her stare as he might be should she be anyone else (202). Rather, he “thought
this sister of Tulliver’s seemed a nice little thing, quite unlike her brother; he wished he had a
little sister. What was it, he wondered, that made Maggie’s dark eyes remind him of the stories
about princesses being turned into animals? I think it was that her eyes were full of unsatisfied
intelligence and unsatisfied, beseeching affection” (202). The “I” here is the narrator interjecting
into Philip’s thoughts, insinuating but not telling that Philip senses Maggie’s thirst for knowledge
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and need to be loved. The keen mindreading depicted in this moment illustrates key sensitivities
in both characters’ personalities and suggests that Philip, too, sees a kindred spirit in Maggie.
As Maggie and Philip’s relationship matures, they open up to each other and converse
about literature and philosophy. Tensions arise, however, when Maggie begins reading and
following the teachings of Thomas à Kempis, a fifteenth-century Christian mystic who insisted
upon renunciation being the key to “inward peace” and freedom from suffering (Eliot 327). In à
Kempis’s Imitation of Christ, Maggie feels that she has found “a secret of life that would enable
her to renounce all other secrets” (328). She later asks of Philip, “‘Is it not right to resign
ourselves entirely, whatever may be denied us? I have found great peace in that for the last two
or three years, even joy in subduing my own will’” (371). Philip “vehemently” disagrees, telling
Maggie, “‘you are shutting yourself up in a narrow, self-delusive fanaticism, which is only a way
of escaping pain by starving into dulness all the highest powers of your nature. Joy and peace are
not resignation; resignation is the willing endurance of a pain that is not allayed, that you don’t
expect to be allayed’” (371). He pleads with Maggie, “‘Listen to me, let me supply you with
books, do let me see you sometimes, be your brother and teacher….It is less wrong that you
should see me than that you should be committing this long suicide’” (373). As Guth confirms,
Philip’s life of suffering has enabled him to persevere through pain as a way of confirming that
he is “wholly alive,” and he thus views Maggie’s renunciation as “an escape from responsibility”
and “an excuse for hopelessness” (361, 360). That Philip endures the affliction of his isolation
demonstrates his adaptability as a character; though his introverted lifestyle has been thrust upon
him, he nevertheless chooses to seek fulfillment rather than yield to heartache. For both selfinterested and self-sacrificing reasons, he urges Maggie to do the same.
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In her exploration of the physio-psychology of habit in The Mill on the Floss, Kristie
Allen supplies an apt vocabulary for discussing Philip’s conviction. Allen distinguishes two
different Victorian ideas regarding habit: first, habit as “passive unconscious reflex,” and second,
habit as “self-actuating reflective behavior” (832). She explains that “Victorian physiologists
believed that habits were established through the ‘exercise’ of the brain” and that habits could be
“flexible dispositions capable of being retrained through conscious effort” (832). In other words,
habits are both unconsciously instinctual and consciously changeable. In The Mill on the Floss,
readers see Maggie determine to change her unconsciously developed depressive psychological
habits through her application of Thomas à Kempis’s attitudes towards renunciation and selfdenial. Maggie transforms her mental and emotional inclinations from having, in her words, “the
bad habit of being unhappy” with the seeming meaninglessness of life, into a lasting philosophy
of asceticism (Eliot 421). Her transformation confirms the Victorian belief that habits,
paradoxically, are malleable. Philip resists the idea that habits can be determined and instead
purports that “‘no one has strength given to do what is unnatural. It is mere cowardice to seek
safety in negations’” (373). His insistence on the durability of disposition suggests that once the
novel is over, he will continue to endure the life that has been given him. Despite the lack of
choice he has had regarding his occupation and social mobility, Philip has chosen to mold his
disposition into an optimistic fortitude that enables him to cope with pain. As evidenced in his
final letter to Maggie, he will continue to subsist on his love for her, the one thing that “sufficed
to withhold [him] from suicide” (573). In this sense, Philip’s principle that Maggie should not
change her “passionate and imaginative nature” is—not hypocritical—but moderately
inconsistent, as he himself has engineered his personality to suit his situation in life (311).
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Philip’s is the last physical presence in the novel. He and Stephen Guest both visit
Maggie and Tom’s tomb to pay respects to “their keenest joy and keenest sorrow,” Stephen first,
accompanied by Lucy’s “sweet face,” and Philip second (596). Philip “was always solitary. His
great companionship was among the trees of the Red Deeps, where the buried joy seemed still to
hover like a revisiting spirit” (596). Philip survives to live the life of sadness and solitude he has
always lived. Once again, for reasons outside his control, Philip is denied happiness. Yet, despite
Eliot’s agonizingly sorrowful ending, readers can be confident Philip will endure. Both Guth and
Allen suggest that the novel’s conclusion confirms Philip’s convictions, thus conveying Eliot’s
own perspective on the philosophy of renunciation. Guth concludes her essay, “Clearly, in killing
Maggie Tulliver George Eliot mourned the loss of some real and valuable part of herself. Philip
speaks for the part that found its refuge and survived” (362). Allen, after contrasting Maggie’s
and Philip’s views on habit, asks, “Does the fact that Philip predicts correctly suggest that
George Eliot’s own view corresponds most closely with his?” (841). Readers can only speculate
as to the answer to this questin, but my instinct is to agree with Allen’s implication. The intensity
of the sympathy Eliot generates for Philip and the anguish readers feel upon his surviving his
beloved surely points to a connectedness between Eliot and her misshapen creation, a theory that
is bolstered by Maggie’s “tenderness for deformed things” (Eliot 201). In developing this thesis
further, I hope to confirm these conjectures with textual evidence to support the view that
Philip’s perspective on the immutability of disposition is also Eliot’s.
The present analysis of Philip’s character has introduced but some of the many intricacies
of Philip’s psychology that merit consideration within the dichotomous context of introversion
and extroversion. The earlier investigations of key characters in Villette and Pride and Prejudice
illustrated how class- and gender-based standards for performance and reticence, as defined in
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conduct books of the time, impacted perceptions of those whose natural dispositions made fitting
into the expected mold difficult. Lucy Snowe’s active rhetorical and behavioral performance of
introversion represents one woman’s efforts to display cultural preferences of reservation and
self-control despite internal proclivities towards passionate self-expression and dramatization;
Jane Bennett’s and Mr. Darcy’s shortcomings in exhibiting sociably extroverted behaviors
delayed their abilities to enter their desired matrimonial engagements. Philip Wakem’s character
complicates this discussion of how introverts and extroverts are perceived on the basis of
nineteenth-century class and gender expectations in that his temperament is perhaps not inherent,
but rather acquired as a result of his disfigurement and his father’s contentious role in society. As
such, using Palmer’s continuing-consciousness frame to construct Philip’s cognitive narrative is
made more complex by adding the element of Philip’s lack of performative agency to the
equation. The complexity of Philip’s psychology is worth the effort of parsing out, not only
because scholarship as of yet has largely neglected this intricate character, but also because of
what he illuminates about society’s treatment of those who differ from the norm, whether or not
they do so by their own choosing.
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